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Summary
This thesis consists of three chapters on auctions and contests. 1 The rst
chapter studies the optimal reward design in contest setting with complete
information; the second chapter studies the design of disclosure policy in rst-
price auctions; the third chapter examines the design of an ecient auction in
a bi-dimensional private information auction environment.
In the rst chapter, we characterize the optimal reward design in sequen-
tially played multi-battle competitions, for both team contests and individual
contests. The contest designer has a xed prize budget to extract eort from
the contestants, and can reward players contingent on the number of battles
they win. We nd that the optimal design is implemented by a contest prize
for the grand winner who wins the majority of battles together with uniform
battle prizes to battle winners. In individual contests, the optimal battle prize
varies with the contest technology. In contrast, winner-take-all is optimal for
team competitions, regardless of the contest technology.
In the second chapter, we study the sellers optimal policy for disclosing the
actual number of bidders in rst-price auctions with stochastic entry through
a Bayesian persuasion approach, which accommodates a general class of diclo-
1The rst and second chapter are co-authored with my supervisor, Prof. Jingfeng Lu,
and the third chapter is co-authored with Prof. Jingfeng Lu and Prof. Yeneng Sun.
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sure policies. Each participating bidder will form own posterior belief upon
upon the public information released by the seller and his own entry status.
We show that when bidders are risk averse (resp. risk loving), the revenue-
maximizing policy is to fully conceal (resp. fully disclose) the actual number
of participating bidders. When bidders are risk neutral, the induced expected
revenue is independent of the disclosure policy. Our analytical procedure ap-
plies to some alternative rst-price and all-pay auction environments.
The third chapter studies ex ante ecient auctions in a setting where bid-
ders have bi-dimensional private information on values and entry costs. By
resolving several diculties due to the nature of the bidimensional screening
problem, we nd that a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to the
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Chapter 1




Dynamic multi-battle contests are abundant in reality. Many economic and so-
cial competitions, including research and development races, lawsuits/litigation,
bidding for procurement contracts, policy debates, legislative, lobbying, elec-
toral campaigns, and sports, can be viewed as contests in which opposing
parties expend non-refundable, costly eort to compete in multiple battles.1
A unique feature naturally arises from the multi-round nature of such compe-
titions: The nal winner of the overall contest, as well as contestants' rewards,
1Refer to Konrad and Kovenock (2009), Konrad (2009), and Kovenock and Roberson
(2012), among many others, for examples of multi-battle contests.
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is in general determined by the outcomes of all battles instead of a single bat-
tle. For example, in a widely adopted winner-take-all best-of-(2n+1) contest,
a party wins the contest if and only if the party wins the majority of the 2n+1
battles, and the winner takes the entire prize.
There exists a wide range of diversity in the prize structures of multi-
battle contests. Often, the nal winner is determined according to the above-
mentioned \majority" rule, and the prize is split between the winner and loser
by xed shares, which are not related to the number of battles won by the
loser. This prize-allocation rule is widely observed in sports. In the nals
of the 2013 US Open tennis tournament, for example, the winners received
$2.6 million, while the losers received $1.3 million.2 More saliently, two-party
political campaign competitions (e.g. those to gain control of the legislature)
have long been viewed as winner-take-all multi-battle contests (e.g., Snyder,
1989, Fu, Lu and Pan, 2015, and Boyer and Konrad, 2015), as well as the
Democratic and Republican primaries that nominate the parties' candidates
for the U.S. presidential election (e.g., Klumpp and Polborn, 2006).
On the other hand, in many instances, intermediate prizes are awarded to
winners of component battles, and prize allocation can be contingent on the
number of component battles each player wins. This type of prize structure is
observed in labor tournaments. In many academic departments, faculty mem-
bers are typically evaluated in three areas: teaching, research, and service.
2Refer to http://www.examiner.com/article/prize-money-at-2013-u-s-open-tennis, ac-
cessed on May 28th, 2015. The prize for the runner-ups is permission to proceed to the nals.
Therefore, the eective prize structure is a winner-take-all for the grand winners. Similarly,
in the nals of the 2015 OUE Singapore Open, the winners received about $23,000 and
the loser received $11,400. Refer to https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tDgVoHm7MW4,
accessed on May 28th, 2015.
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Excellent in one or two areas usually results in a performance bonus and/or
pay increase, while excellent overall typically leads to extra and more signi-
cant benets, including higher likelihood of promotion. Similar arrangements
are prevalent in sports. The Federation Internationale de Volleyball (FIVB)
World League (for men) and World Grand Prix (for women) are examples of
intermediate prizes for each single match. In the group stage of the tourna-
ment, each match is a best-of-ve game; since 2010, the winning team earns 3
match points and the losing team receives 0 if the nal set score is either 3-0 or
3-1. The winning team earns 2 match points and the losing team wins 1 match
point if the nal set score is 3-2.3 In Formula I car races, each Grand Prix
allots points to teams according to their ranks, and the grand championship
as well as F1's prize money is awarded on an annual basis at the end of the
season based on teams' championship points. A single point (a race win is
worth 25 points) is, potentially, worth millions of dollars.4
More broadly, similar incentive structures prevail in multi-round lawsuits,
competitions for procurement contracts as well as parliamentary debates on
government policies, proposed legislation, and current issues. Dierent parties
collect and provide evidence in multiple rounds to support their own inter-
ests/views. Eventually, the chance that a particular conclusion/outcome will
be reached is determined by information revealed/collected and the outcomes
3We thank Xiandeng Jiang for this example. Please refer to Jiang (2014) for details.
4Refer to http://www.f1fanatic.co.uk/2014/11/17/design-points-system-formula-one/;
http://www.tsmplug.com/f1/formula-1-prize-money/; and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
2013 Formula One season/. Similarly, the Professional Golfers' Association(PGA) tour
awards winners of all component tournaments, and a grand prize is awarded to the overall
best performer at the end of the tour. Refer to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PGA Tour,
accessed on May 28th, 2015.
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of all rounds of hearings/debates. In this kind of examples, in order to make a
convincing decision, more evidence and eorts in collecting evidence are pre-
ferred. And the chance of continuing the debates can be viewed as rewards,
since that may aect the nal outcome. The prize allocation rule essentially
answers the question whether the debates should be terminated and a decision
should be made accordingly when a party wins majority rounds. These prac-
tices demonstrate how prize allocations can be contingent on how many battles
each party wins. In general, prize structures could depend on both battle out-
comes and the overall contest outcome, but are not necessarily restricted to
contest prizes and battle prizes.5
Interesting questions thus arise: How does contest organizers' choice of
prize-allocation rules depend on the contest structure? In particular, for which
situations should the allocation rule solely rely on the performance aggregated
over all battles, i.e., the nal winning status of the whole contest, and for
which situations should the players be awarded separately in each individual
battle, but not on their aggregate performance? Why do commonly observed
prize structures usually take a simple form, such as the combination of a grand
contest prize and component battle prizes, when contest organizers have access
to more sophisticated contingent prize-allocation rules?
In this paper, we aim to rationalize commonly adopted prize-allocation
rules from the perspective of eort elicitation by a contest organizer who can
exibly reward contestants based on their numbers of winning battles.6 For
5The contest outcome, however, is eventually determined by battle outcomes. In this
sense, there is no loss of generality to describe all feasible prize structures as prize-allocation
rules that are solely contingent on battle outcomes.
6Gradstein and Konrad (1999) point out that: \contest structures result from the careful
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this purpose, we consider dynamic three-battle contests that allow for a whole
spectrum of contest technology in the Tullock family, and fully characterize
the eort-maximizing prize structures among all feasible allocation rules that
are contingent on battle outcomes. Sequential battles can be played either
between two xed players or by varying pairs of players from two opposing
teams. We nd that the optimal design is a best-of-three contest with both
a contest prize to the grand winner of the whole contest and uniform battle
prizes to battle winners. The player structure and discriminatory power of the
contest technology play crucial roles in determining the prizes' optimal shares.
We rst study the optimal contingent prize-allocation rule that elicits the
maximum aggregate eort in a sequential-play multi-battle contest between
two risk-neutral players with unit marginal eort cost. In every component
battle, both players observe the outcomes of previous battles and exert eort
simultaneously. We allow a full spectrum of contest technology in the Tullock
family to model component battles, which are indexed by the discriminatory
power (r) of the corresponding contest success function. Specically, the con-
test organizer has a xed budget (normalized as 1) to fund nonnegative prizes
for competing parties.7 She has the exibility of fully allocating the budget
contingent on battle outcomes, i.e., the wins that each party secures, subject
to a monotonicity condition that requires the more battles a party wins, the
larger share of prize the party takes.8 A particularly interesting, but rather
consideration of a variety of objectives, one of which is to maximize the eort of contenders."
7If the organizer's budget is indivisible, she can equivalently use winning probabilities as
design instruments. For convenience, we assume that the prize budget must be exhausted.
8We assume that the prize allocation does not depend on the identities of the competing
parties.
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intricate, issue is how much prize should be granted to a player with a single
win when the discriminatory power (r) of the corresponding Tullock contest
technology alters, as we will illustrate in our analysis.
We fully characterize the optimal contingent prize allocation for every posi-
tive discriminatory power r(> 0). For each r, we rst characterize the subgame
perfect equilibrium by backward induction for each eligible contingent prize
allocation rule. We then compare across all eligible contingent prize-allocation
rules to identify the optimal rule. The procedure requires lengthy compu-
tations and multi-step comparison. In particular, computing players' total
expected eort for a given prize structure requires aggregating their eorts
across every possible path. Because of the diculties generated by potential
ex post asymmetry due to the sequential nature of the contest and its eect on
players' strategies, we have to consider multiple overlapping subsets of eligible
prize structures separately, and obtain the optimal prize-allocation rule within
each subset. Comparison across all the restricted optimums yields the globally
optimal prize-allocation rule.
For a sequentially played three-battle individual contest, we nd that its
optimal prize-allocation rule crucially depends on the discriminatory power r
of the contest technology adopted for component battles. The discriminatory
power in a Tullock contest measures the importance of a player's eort in
determining his winning probability. A higher discriminatory power r means
that the winning chances are determined more by players' eort than by other
random factors that also aect contestants' performance.9 Specically, when
9Fu and Lu (2012a) provide a microfoundation for nested Tullock contests from a noisy
ranking perspective.
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the discriminatory power is low, a winner-take-all best-of-three contest is op-
timal; when the discriminatory power falls in the intermediate or high range,
the optimal design takes the form of a best-of-three contest with both a con-
test prize to the grand winner and uniform battle prizes to battle winners. In
particular, in the intermediate range, the battle prize becomes positive and
increases to one third of the total prize as the discriminatory power increases.
In other words, the optimal prize structure evolves from winner-take-all to
proportional division rule as r increases in this range. In the high range,
interestingly, a whole span of battle prizes, ranging from winner-take-all to
proportional division rule, is optimal.
The economics and intuitions behind these characterizations can be illus-
trated as follows. For convenience, we use v(n) to denote the prize awarded to
a player winning n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g battles. It is natural that v(0) = 0 (and thus
v(3) = 1) is necessary to elicit maximal eort from players, since rewarding
a player without a single win dampens players' incentive certainly. The more
interesting and intricate trade-o lies in the balance between v(1) and v(2),
the prizes for a single win and two wins. Should a positive prize be granted
to a player with a single win? If yes, what is the optimal prize level? How
should it depend on the discriminatory power r?
We rst introduce a useful fact to illustrate the impact of a marginal change
in v(1): Any eligible prize structure fv(n); n = 0; 1; 2; 3g with v(0) = 0 and
v(3) = 1 is equivalent to the combination of a grand contest prize vg to the
grand winner who wins at least two battles, and a uniform battle prize vb to
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the winner of each battle, where vb = v(1) and vg = 1 3v(1).10 Therefore, the
trade-o between v(1) and v(2) becomes the trade-o between battle prizes
and contest prize. A (> 0) increase in battle prize vb means a three-time drop
in contest prize vg. Because of the xed budget, we have to evaluate which
prize contributes more in eort elicitation. Intuitively, both grand prize and
battle prize can aect players' incentives and eort supply through multiple
channels.
We discuss their contributions separately. High battle prizes raise players'
eective prize spreads in component battles, and therefore increase players'
eort supply in each component battle. In addition, high battle prizes can
reduce the momentum/discouragement eect well-established in sequentially
played multi-battle contests between two individuals and balance the whole
competition. The \strategic momentum eect" or \discouragement eect" as
rst identied by Harris and Vickers (1987) says that one's (perhaps purely
accidental) early lead would allow him to attain easy wins in the future, as it
forces his lagging opponent to concede prematurely. One extreme example of
battle prizes is the proportional division prize allocation rule, in which each
battle winner wins one third of the budget. Given the proportional division
rule, since players' prize spreads always equal one third in each battle, early
winning will not increase a players' incentive in competing in future battles,
i.e., the momentum/discouragement eect disappears, and therefore the com-
petition will not become less competitive after the rst or the second battle is
played, no matter what the previous outcomes are. On the other hand, a prize
10This equivalence is established in Section 3.3.
8
structure with high grand prize raises players' eort signicantly in the rst
stage, as well as, the third stage when each player wins one battle. For exam-
ple, consider a winner-take-all prize structure where the grand contest prize is
set at its maximum. Compared to propositional rule, winner-take-all acceler-
ates the end of the competition for two reasons. One is, in a possible situation
that each player has won the rst two battles, neither player has incentive to
ght in battle 3, since no further prize is provided. Moreover, winner-take-all
strengthens the momentum/discouragement eect, which means the winner of
the rst battle has higher incentive and higher chance to win battle 2, due to
the desirable grand prize, and therefore the contest will more likely end after
the rst two battles.11
We emphasize that the discriminatory power r plays an important role in
accessing these prize structures, in terms of their induced eort levels. Note
that under a higher discriminatory power r, eort is more eective in de-
termining the winner, and therefore players react more sensitively to prizes.
When discriminatory power r stays low, since other random factors are non-
negligible, momentum/discouragement eect is weak. Therefore, with high
chance, the contest will not end soon even under winner-take-all structure. In
this case, grand prize is more likely to elicit larger eort than battle prizes,
which leads to the optimality of a maximum grand prize and zero battle prizes.
As the discriminatory power r moves into the intermediate range, momen-
tum/discouragement eect becomes stronger. To balance the second-stage
contest and elongate the competition, it is optimal to provide a positive battle
11We present more detailed intuitions in Section 3.1.2.
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prize that increases with r. When r moves into a higher range, i.e., r  2,
players react so sensitively to prizes that their rents are fully dissipated under
any eligible prize structure.
For the purpose of comparison and conviction of our explanation above, we
further analyze sequential-play three-battle team contests. The multi-battle
team contests have been analyzed by Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015). In their model,
two teams with an equal number of players compete in a contest. Players
from rival teams form pairwise matches to ght in multiple component bat-
tles sequentially. A team wins if and only if its players secure a majority
number of victories. Each player benets from his team's win, while he can
also receive a private reward for winning his own battle. The authors nd that
the strategic momentum/discouragement eect typically identied in dynamic
multi-battle contests with two players is nullied in this team-contest setting.
Hafner (2015) further conrms the robustness of this nding in a tug-of-war
team contest with sequential battles. In our model, the prize awarded to a
team is a public good for every member of the team, and the organizer en-
dogenously chooses the optimal contingent rule to reward the two teams based
on their number of winning battles. We nd a winner-take-all best-of-three
contest is optimal in this environment for any positive discriminatory power r.
The intuition behind the result is rather clear: Even when there is no battle
prize, the momentum/discouragement eect does not exist in team contests.
In team contests, therefore, a positive battle prize no longer boosts eort sup-
ply through the channel of mitigating the momentum/discouragement eect.
As a result, a zero battle prize is optimal. The optimality of zero battle prize in
10
team contests further conrms that the optimality of a positive battle prize in
contests between the same two individual players is mainly due to mitigation
of the discouragement eect.
Our paper primarily belongs to the well-established literature on multi-
battle contests. Environments in which the battles are contested sequentially
have been analyzed by Harris and Vickers (1987), Ferall and Smith (1999),
Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Konrad and Kovenock (2009, 2010), McFall,
Knoeber, and Thurman (2009), Malueg and Yates (2010), and Sela (2011),
among others. Harris and Vickers (1987) study a multi-battle patent race.
Klumpp and Polborn (2006) model U.S. presidential primaries as a multi-battle
dynamic contest between two candidates. Malueg and Yates (2010) study
players' strategic eort supply in best-of-three contests and test their theoret-
ical prediction empirically using tennis data. All of these studies identify the
so-called strategic momentum/discouragement eect in dynamic multi-battle
contests with two players. Konrad and Kovenock (2009) completely charac-
terize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in multi-battle contests with
intermediate prizes, in which component contests are modeled as all-pay auc-
tions. They nd that even a large lead by one player may not fully discourage
the other when a component battle awards a positive intermediate prize.12 Sela
(2011) compares the best-of-three all-pay auction to the standard one-stage
all-pay auction.
We further this line of research by examining how intermediate prizes can
be optimally designed and employed to mitigate the strategic-momentum eect
12Irfanoglua et al. (2011) and Mago and Sheremeta (2012) test these theoretical implica-
tions experimentally.
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and provide the best incentive for contestants. To our best knowledge, ours is
the rst study of optimal contingent prize allocation in the context of dynamic
multi-battle contests. A winner-take-all prize structure, together with a \ma-
jority" winning rule, is commonly adopted in practice in multi-battle contests,
and typically assumed in the literature. Our paper rationalizes the optimal-
ity of this popular prize-allocation rule in a wide range of environments in a
dynamic multi-battle contest context. This nding extends the validity of the
winner-take-all principle which has been established in many other settings,
including Krishna and Morgan (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) among oth-
ers. In particular, many papers adopting Tullock contest technology establish
the optimality of winner-take-all when discriminatory power r is in low range
in various contest settings, such as Clark and Riis (1998), Fu and Lu (2012b),
Moller (2012), Schweinzer and Segev (2012), and Clark, Nilssen and Sand
(2012) and so on.
We nd that a prize-allocation rule that rewards every positive number of
wins (i.e., split awards contingent on overall battle outcomes) generates the
maximum expected total eort when the battles proceed sequentially between
the same two players and the discriminatory power r is either in middle range
or high range. In particular, the reward for winning one battle increases and
the reward for winning two battles decreases with r when it is in the middle
range. These ndings suggest that intermediate prizes can facilitate eort
elicitation on many occasions in dynamic multi-battle contests between two
players.13
13Mago, Sheremeta, and Yates (2013) nd that rewarding intermediate battle prizes could
boost eort supply in dynamic contests, even with small r. However, in their study, extra
12
The merit of a split-award has also been extensively investigated in the
procurement literature, where the central issue is the buyer's optimal choice
between single sourcing and multiple sourcing. Riordan and Sappington (1989)
show that in a dynamic setting, second sourcing can be optimal. Anton and
Yao (1992), and Anton, Brusco, and Lopomo (2010) establish the existence
of split-award equilibria when a dis-economy of scale is present in production.
Gong, Li, and McAfee (2012) rationalize the optimality of a split-award by
suppliers' investment incentive. Our study extends this line of research on
split-award to the context of dynamic multi-battle contests.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we rst set up
our model of sequentially played three-battle contests between two same play-
ers and introduce prize allocation rules contingent on battle outcomes. We
then introduce existing results on equilibrium analysis in single-stage settings,
which lay the foundation for analyzing the sequential three-battle contests. In
Section 3, we proceed to analyze the sequential three-battle contest under any
eligible contest technology and prize allocation rule, and identify the optimal
contingent prize-allocation rule for each contest technology within the tullock
family. In Section 4, we examine an alternative setting of sequential team
contests with multiple pairwise battles, which further illustrates the economic
forces that shape the players' incentives and optimal prize allocation rules in
dierent environments. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. The technical
proofs are relegated to the appendix and the online appendix.
battle prizes are funded by an additional budget.
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1.2 The model setup
Two players A and B compete in a dynamic three-battle contest. Both of them
are risk-neutral and have unit marginal eort cost. They ght the three battles
sequentially, and observe the past outcomes (i.e., the state of the contest)
before exerting eort in the current battle.
The contest organizer has a prize budget V , which is normalized to 1. The
organizer's prize-allocation rule is contingent on the contest outcome, i.e., the
number of battles each player wins. Let v(n), n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g denote the prize
that a player wins if he wins n battles. Alternatively, v(n) can be interpreted
as the winning probability of a single indivisible grand prize with value 1. We
therefore have the following feasibility restrictions on the prize allocations:
v(n) + v(n0) = 1, 8n; n0 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; n+ n0 = 3; (1.1)
v(n)  v(n0); 8n  n0; (1.2)
v(n)  0; 8n: (1.3)
The rst constraint says that the sum of prizes for the two players equals
the total prize budget. The second constraint says that the player with more
wins is awarded a higher prize. The third constraint is that the prizes cannot
be negative, which is natural when v(n) is interpreted as winning probabilities
or the players are subject to limited liability. Note that the winning-probability
interpretation is particularly relevant when the prize V is indivisible.
In Section 3.3, we will establish that any prize structure fv(n); n = 0; 1; 2; 3g
14
is equivalent to a combination of an entry fee/subsidy for each player, a uni-
form battle prize for the winner of each battle, and a grand contest prize for
the player who wins at least two battles. For the ease of exposition, we will
rst focus on structures v(n), n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g in our main analysis, and later
adopt the equivalent alternative structures to further interpret the ndings.
A generalized Tullock contest technology is adopted for each component
battle, in which both players exert their eorts simultaneously. Let xA and
xB denote the players' eort in a battle. Player i's probability of winning the





where i; j 2 fA;Bg and r 2 (0;1) denotes




any r 2 (0;1).
Since the battles are played sequentially, the outcome of past battles, or
the state of the contest, is observed by both players before the subsequent
battle is fought. The state of the contest is denoted by (nA; nB) when player
i 2 fA;Bg has secured ni wins. When the state of the contest is (nA; nB), we
denote player i's eective prize spread of winning the subsequent battle (i.e.,
the (nA + nB + 1) th battle) by vi(nA; nB), which is his expected reward of
winning the (nA+nB+1) th battle; player i's equilibrium eort supply in the
subsequent battle by xi(nA; nB); and player i's equilibrium winning probability
of the subsequent battle by pi(nA; nB).
In this paper, we study the optimal prize-allocation rule that elicits the
highest expected aggregate eort in the contest.
We rst present some existing results of equilibrium analysis in a two-player
Tullock contest with asymmetric values and an arbitrary discriminatory power
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r, which will form the foundation for our analysis. Consider two players i and
j competing in a generalized Tullock contest with discriminatory power r.
The value of player i is vi and the value of player j is vj, without loss of






where xi and xj denote players' eorts, and r 2 (0;1) denotes the
discriminatory power of the contest. We let xi(vi; vj; r) and xj(vi; vj; r) denote
the players' equilibrium strategy, which can be either pure or mixed.
Denition 1.1. For z 2 (0; 1], a cuto r^(z) 2 (1; 2] is dened as the unique
solution to r = 1 + zr:
Nti (1999) establishes that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists if and only
if r is bounded from above by a cuto r^(
vj
vi
)  2 and provides a complete
characterization of the equilibrium strategy. Wang (2010) analyzes the case of
r 2 (r^(vj
vi
); 2] and obtains a closed-form solution to the equilibrium strategy.15
The mixed-strategy equilibrium in an all-pay auction has been analyzed ex-
tensively in the literature starting from Hillman and Riley (1989). Alcalde and
Dahm (2010) analyze the case of r > 2 relying on the result of Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries (1994). They show there exists an \all-pay-auction" equilibrium
in mixed strategies, although a closed-form solution of the equilibrium strate-
gies is yet to be identied. We use this result to obtain the equilibrium eort
outlays in contests. These characterizations are summarized as follows:
Lemma 1.1. Assuming vi  vj > 0, the equilibrium bidding strategies xi(vi; vj; r)
and xj(vi; vj; r) are:
14Otherwise, we could relabel the two players.
15The cuto r^( yx ) converges to 2 when x approaches y, i.e., when the two players are
symmetric. In that case, the particular case analyzed by Wang (2010) vanishes.
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(i) If r  r^(vj
vi
),

















(ii) If r 2 (r^(vj
vi
); 2],


















0; with probability 1  q:
(iii) If r > 2,
xi(vi; vj; r) = 
; xj(vi; vj; r) =
8><>: 
; with probability q = vj
vi
;
0; with probability 1  q:
where  is the (symmetric) equilibrium mixed strategy identied by Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1994) in a two-player Tullock contest with r > 2,
and fully dissipates the rent in the symmetric game when both valuations equal
vj.
In all three cases, xi(vi; vj; r) is a more aggressive strategy than xj(vi; vj; r)
as long as vi  vj, i.e., the contestant with the higher valuation tends to exert
more eort. In Case (i), Nti (1999) shows that the proposed pure-strategy
equilibrium is unique.16 The uniqueness of the equilibrium in Case (ii) can
16Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) and Cornes and Hartley (2005) show that when r 2
(0; 1], there is a unique pure-strategy equilibrium in a one-shot Tullock contest.
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be shown among the class of semi-pure strategy equilibria in which active
players bid in pure strategy, and the uniqueness of equilibrium in Case (iii)
is established by Ewerhart (2012). These results together mean that in our
setting with sequential battles, the subgame perfect equilibrium for any prize
structure and any power r is unique.
To pin down the optimal prize structure that elicits the maximum expected
aggregate eort, for each feasible fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g; we need to compute
players' equilibrium eorts along each possible path and the probability of




), which varies with the ratio of the two players' prize spreads in
the concerned battle. In the next section, we will show that, in an individual
contest, players have symmetric prize spreads in the rst and third battles,
while, in general, their prize spreads are asymmetric in the second battle.
Consequently, we have r^ = 2 for the rst and third battles, and r^ 2 (1; 2) in
general for the second battle.
1.3 Optimal prize allocation
To derive the optimal prize-allocation rule for a xed r associated with the
Tullock technology, we have to compare across all feasible prize structures in
terms of the induced aggregate eort. For this purpose, we solve the dynamic
game backwards by adopting the building-block equilibrium strategies pro-
vided by Lemma 1:1. We therefore consider Case 1, in which r 2 (0; 2] in
Section 3.1, and Case 2, in which r > 2 in Section 3.2. This categorization
18
reects the fact that dierent parts of Lemma 1.1 must be applied in dierent
ranges of r.
We would like to emphasize that in battle 2, since the players' prize spreads
are endogenously determined by r and fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g, and therefore
are asymmetric, r^ in Lemma 1.1 thus must be contingent on prize structure
fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g and r. As a result, under a prevailing contest technology
with the discriminatory power r, dierent forms of equilibria (as described in
Lemma 1.1) might apply as prize structure varies, which makes it dicult to
compare all feasible prize structures to pin down the optimum. An additional
technical diculty is that it is even not straightforward to determine which
equilibrium prevails for the given r and fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g.
Our strategy for searching for the optimal prize structure for any given r 2
(0;1) is to categorize the prize structures into dierent overlapping regions.
For each region, we are able to pin down the specic expression for the total
expected eort and derive the restricted optimum. Then we compare across
all regions and obtain the unrestricted global optimum.
1.3.1 Case 1: r 2 (0; 2]
We rst consider the range of r 2 (0; 2], which is more interesting in economics
and also more challenging to analyze. As will be shown later, for any feasible
prize structure, players' prize spreads are in general asymmetric in the second
battle, and therefore the resulting cuto r^ of Lemma 1:1 in general falls in
(1; 2) for this battle. Depending on the comparison between r and r^, either
part (i) or (ii) would apply. Moreover, players' prize spreads depend on the
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given prize structure and discriminatory power r, which further complicates
the comparison between r and r^. To facilitate writing down the aggregate
eort clearly as a function of prize structure fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g and r, in
general we consider four sub-areas for the feasible prize structures for each
r 2 (0; 2], as will be dened in Denition 3. The details are as follows.
Fix a feasible prize structure fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g and an r 2 (0; 2]. We
start from the third stage and look at players' incentives at each reachable state
of the whole contest. When each has won one battle, their common eective
prize spread of winning the third battle is vA(1; 1) = vB(1; 1) = v(2)   v(1).
As a result, r^ = 2 for battle 3. By Lemma 1:1(i), their common equilibrium
eort supply is given by xA(1; 1) = xB(1; 1) =
r
4
(v(2)   v(1)), and each wins
the third battle with half probability pA(1; 1) = pB(1; 1) =
1
2
. When a player
has won the rst two battles (i.e., (nA; nB) = (2; 0) or (0; 2)), he responds to
his eective prize spread v(3)  v(2) in battle 3 and his opponent responds to
the prize spread v(1)   v(0). The two players have a common eective prize
spread of winning the third battle because of the budget constraints (1), which
also leads to r^ = 2 for battle 3. By Lemma 1:1(i), their common equilibrium




and each of them has a half chance to win the third battle. Note that players'
incentives remain symmetric in battle 3, regardless of the state.
We now proceed to the second battle. Suppose that the state is (1; 0), i.e.,
player A has won the rst battle. His prize spread equals
wA := vA(1; 0) = [pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  xA(2; 0)]
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His opponent, player B, the loser of the rst battle, has a prize spread
wB := vB(1; 0) = [pB(1; 1)v(2) + pA(1; 1)v(1)  xB(1; 1)]




























In the second battle, wA and wB, respectively, reect the incentives of the
winner and loser of the rst battle when r 2 (0; 2]. We dene them formally
below. Note that the two players' incentives in the second battle is in general
asymmetric, unless v(2)  v(1) = v(1)  v(0).17
Denition 1.2. Dene  = wB
wA
. More accurately,  := (v(0); v(2); r) is
function of v(0), v(2) and r.
















(< 1) for a given r 2 (0; 2].
17The alternative interpretation of the prize structure in Section 1.3.3 shows that this
condition means that each battle provides one third of the total budget to its winner. The
rewards, therefore are independent of players' aggregate performance under this condition.
21













] for r 2 (0; 2]. These bounds will be
frequently employed in our analysis.
Given an r 2 (0; 2], to solve the players' equilibrium eort supply in battle
2, we adopt the equilibrium strategy described by Lemma 1.1(i) or 1.1(ii), and
it is the cuto r^(
minfwi;wjg
maxfwi;wjg) that determines which one should be adopted. Note
that this cuto depends on players' incentives to win the second battle, which
can be asymmetric and vary with the prize structure fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g
and r. In fact, it is the prize structure and r that determine the magnitude of
each player's incentive to win battle 2, in particular, who has the higher in-
centive. Consequently, for the given r 2 (0; 2], dierent equilibrium strategies
might be applicable in battle 2 as the prize structures vary. To identify the
form of the two players' equilibrium strategies in battle 2, we introduce the
following four overlapping sets Vi; i 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g, whose union is the collection
V of all feasible prize-allocation rules. Note that for each set Vi, we are able
to pin down the players' equilibrium strategies in the second battle since the
associated restrictions make it clear which part of Lemma 1:1 would apply.
Denition 1.3. (i) 8r, we dene V = f(v(0); v(2)) : 0  v(0)  1
2
 v(2) 
1 and v(2) + v(0)  1g, which is the collection of all feasible prize-allocation
rules;
(ii) 8r 2 (0; 2], V = [3i=0Vi, where
V0 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : r  1 + (wA
wB
)r and wA  wBg;
V1 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : r  1 + (wB
wA
)r and wA  wBg;
V2 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : 1 + (wB
wA
)r < r  2 and wA  wBg;
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V3 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : 1 + (wA
wB
)r < r  2 and wA  wBg:
The restrictions 0  v(0)  1
2
 v(2)  1 and v(2) + v(0)  1 in the de-
nition of V are equivalent to the monotonicity (i.e., (1:2)) and non-negativity
(i.e., (1:3)) of prizes v(n) under budget constraint (1:1).
In general, we need to search for the optimal prize structure within each
Vi and compare across all four Vis. However, we rst restrict our search to the
prize structures in V0 [ V1. And then we will show that it is without loss of
any generality, since the optimal prize structure is within V0 [ V1.
Analysis
We are now ready to analyze the optimal prize structure for Case 1, i.e., when
r 2 (0; 2). For each such prize structure in V0 [ V1, we can pin down the
expected aggregate eort elicited at the subgame perfect equilibrium. The
details are presented in the proof of Lemma 1.2 (see Appendix A.1). For any
such prize structure, computing aggregate eort requires pinning down the
players' equilibrium eort at each stage for every possible path. Lemma 1:1(i)
is applicable in all three battles for prize structures in V0[V1. The equilibrium
is unique for the reasons illustrated after Lemma 1:1.

























Note that TE1 solely depends on prizes v(0) and v(2), which satisfy the
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following restrictions: 0  v(0)  1
2
 v(2)  1; and v(0) + v(2)  1.
We introduce the following denition, which facilitates identifying the net




D(; r)  [(3r
2








)( r + 1 + (r + 1)r)]




As we will show later, D(; r) summarizes the net eect of a change in
v(2) on the aggregate eort TE1(v(0); v(2))jv(0)=0. In addition, we dene r









= 0 and D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r ;r=r = 0 with









= (r   1) 1r . And
r 2 (r; r).18 In particular, simulations show that r  1:09, r  1:19 and
r  1:31.
We now state our main result on optimal prize structure for Case 1 in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1.1. In a sequential three-battle contest with two players, the unique
eort-maximizing prize structure (v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)) is respectively:
(i) (0; 0; 1; 1) (i.e., winner-take-all) if r 2 (0; r];
(ii) (0; 1  vr(2); vr(2); 1) if r 2 (r; r],
18We analytically show that r < r < r. Please refer to proofs of Properties A.1 and A.2
in Appendix A.4 for the argument.
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where vr(2) 2 (23 ; 1) is the unique v(2) that solves
D((v(0); v(2); r); r)jv(0)=0 = 0;
(iii) (0; 1  vr(2); vr(2); 1) if r 2 (r; 2],





















; 1) decreases with r and reaches 2
3
(i.e., proportional rule) when r = 2.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1.1 is quite lengthy and consists of several major
steps. Here, we only depict a road map. The complete proof is provided in
Appendix A.1.
In step 1, we consider two subcases with r 2 (0; r] and r 2 (r; 2] respec-
tively, and show that there is no loss of generality to search for the optimal
prize structure within region V0 [V1 when r  2. We thus can adopt the TE1
in (4) of Lemma 1.2 as the applicable total eort for our analysis.
In step 2, we show that v(0) = 0 and thus v(3) = 1 at optimum.
With the optimal v(0) and v(3), we further show that the rst-order deriva-
tive of TE1(v(0); v(2))jv(0)=0 with respect to v(2) shares the same sign with





















)(2v(2) 1) only depends on v(2) and r. In particular, it
decreases with v(2).
In step 3, we introduce Properties A.1 to A.3 of the D(; r) function in
Appendix A.4, which play instrumental roles in determining vr(2) in the fol-
lowing proofs for parts (i)-(iii) of this theorem. In particular, Properties A.1
and A.2 imply r 2 (r; r), and that D(; r)j=
r
is U-shaped with two roots
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at r and r by construction, and reaches its minimum at r (see Figure 1.1).
Here, 
r
is the lower bound that (v(0) = 0; v(2); r) can reach within region










; r 2 (0; r];
(r   1) 1r ; r 2 (r; 2]:
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For part (i) where r  r, recall (v(0) = 0; v(2); r) strictly decreases with
v(2) 2 [1
2











When r 2 (0; r), for any v(2) 2 [1
2
; 1], we have D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r) >


























= 0 by Property A.1.










holds for any v(2) 2 [1
2
; 1). We also have v(2) = 1.
For the proof of part (ii), we consider two ranges: r 2 (r; r] and r 2 (r; r],
since two dierent lower bounds for  would apply.




for  still applies.








< 0; 8r 2 (r; r] by
Property A.1, while D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r)jv(2)= 2
3
= 3r2 + 12 > 0. More-
over, D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r) decreases in v(2) by Property A.3 and the fact
that (v(0) = 0; v(2); r) decreases with v(2). Together with the continuity of
D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r) in v(2), there exists, for each r 2 (r; r], a unique so-







is achieved by the feasible prize structure
(v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)) = (0; 0; 1; 1) 2 V1 for r 2 (0; r], and the other bound (r   1) 1r is also







< (r   1) 1r .
Take v(2; r) 2 ( 12 ; 1) such that wBwA jv(0)=0 = 1. Clearly, wBwA jv(0)=0  (r   1)
1
r . Note that
wB
wA







< (r   1) 1r , we must have v(2) 2 [v(2; r); 1) such
that wBwA jv(0)=0 = (r   1)
1
r . Note that such a prize prole is in V1 for r 2 (r; 2].
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lution vr(2) 2 [23 ; 1) of D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r) = 0 such that D((v(0) =
0; v(2); r); r) > 0 when v(2) < vr(2) and D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r) < 0
when v(2) > vr(2). Therefore, the prize structure (v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)) =
(0; 1  vr(2); vr(2); 1) induces the maximum aggregate eort when r 2 (r; r].
When r 2 (r; r], the associated restrictions r  1 + (wB
wA
)r = 1 + r on
prize structures V0 and V1 implies the lower bound (r   1) 1r applies. The rest
of the proof is analogous to the above arguement.
For the proof of part (iii) where r 2 (r; 2], we have lower bound (r 1) 1r ap-
plies and D(; r)  D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r > 0, where r
 satises D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r ;r=r =
0. Therefore, an increase in v(2) always raises the aggregate eort for each




















responds to the applicable lower bound (r  1) 1r for . We have d
dr
(vr(2)) < 0
for r 2 (r; 2].20
Theorem 1.1 fully identies the optimal prize structure for every r 2
(0; 2]: When r 2 (0; r], winner-take-all is optimal; when r 2 (r; r], the
optimal vr(2) is implicitly determined and falls in (
2
3
; 1), and simulations
show that vr(2) strictly decreases in this range;
21 when r 2 (r; 2], vr(2) =












, which decreases with r.
In order to show Theorem 1.1, we evaluate the net eect of v(2) on the
aggregate eort for any r 2 (0; 2] by checking D(; r), which summarizes
the eect of a change in v(2) on the aggregate eort, and note that D(; r)
20This is because ddr (v

r (2)) =   4
r

3r+3r(r 1) 1r +2(r 1) 1r 2
2 [r(1   (r   1) 2r ) +
(r   1) 1r ( 2rr 1   2 (ln (r   1)))] < 0, 8r 2 (1; 2):
21Since vr (2) is implicitly determined in this range, i.e., when r 2 (r; r], an explicit
expression is not available as well as an analytical proof for the monotonicity.
27
decreases with v(2), 8r 2 (0; 2].




> 0 for a particular r, we have ddv(2)TE1(v(0); v(2))jv(0)=0 >
0 for all eligible v(2). That is, an increase in v(2) raises aggregate eort so
that v(2) should be set as high as possible at the optimum. In other words,
the optimal v(2) should be set at the highest applicable level. This is the
case when r  r; and therefore the optimal vr(2) is set at the highest value
of 1 in applicable sets V0 [ V1. This is also the case when r  r 2 (r; 2).
Therefore, for r  r, the optimal vr(2) is set at the highest possible value of












constrainted by prize sets V0 [ V1 for such an r.
WhenD(; r)j=
r
< 0 for a particular r, we have ddv(2)TE1(v(0); v(2))jv(0)=0 <
0 for the highest v(2) in the applicable prize sets, so that reducing this v(2)
would increase aggregate eort until D((v(0); v(2)); r) = 0. In this case, we
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have an interior optimum. This is the case when r 2 (r; r). In this case, vr(2)
is uniquely determined by D((v(0) = 0; vr(2); r); r) = 0.
We plot vr(1) = 1   vr(2) as a function of r in Figure 1.2. The optimal
prize structure crucially depends on the discriminatory power r of the contest
technology. Specically, optimal prize vr(1) for a single win remains zero when
r is low, i.e. r 2 (0; r]; and then becomes positive when r falls in the interme-
diate, i.e. r 2 (r; r]; when r 2 (r; 2], vr(1) strictly and continuously increases
with r and reaches 1
3
at the maximum. In sum, the optimal prize structure
evolves from winner-take-all to proportional division rule as r increases in the
range of (0; 2].
Figure 1.2: The Optimal Prize vr(1)
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Intuitions
First of all, it is natural that the optimal v(0) = 0 and thus v(3) = 1 for every
r 2 (0; 2], since awarding a player who wins no battle and thus panelizing the
other player who wins all battles would not provide more incentive for players
to exert high eort. We thus focus on understanding how the optimal v(1)
or equivalently v(2) reacts to a change in contest technology (i.e. r). Note
that v(2)  1
2
for any feasible prize structure. Consider a decrease in v(2),
and therefore an increase in v(1) (due to the budget constraint (1:1)), which
increases the incentive of the loser of battle 1, but reduces the incentive of the
winner of battle 1. Consequently, the contest becomes more balanced in the
sense that the early loser is more likely to win the second battle. As a result,
both players are better incentivized in battle 2. However, both players tend
to exert less eort in battle 1 to ght for the reduced advantage in the second
battle.
The mitigated momentum/discouragement eect in the second battle due
to the marginal increase in v(1) increases the chance that the contest will
reach a state (1; 1) and decreases the chance of state (2; 0) or (0; 2) for the
third battle, which tends to increase the eort supply in the third battle. This
is because at state (1; 1), the competition is more balanced, and therefore
elicits higher eort from players. However, a negative eect in battle 3 can
also arise from a higher v(1). An increase in v(1) reduces the prize spread in
the third battle when state (1; 1) is reached, and enlarges the prize spread in
the third battle when state (2; 0) or (0; 2) is reached. Specically, the decrease
in prize spread for state (1; 1) doubles the increase in prize spreads for states
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(2; 0) and (0; 2).
Nevertheless, when the prevailing momentum/discouragement eect in the
second battle is suciently strong due to the higher r, an increase in v(1)
does not only encourage the early loser and thus also better incentivize the
early winner when the contest reaches battle 2, but also boost the eort sup-
ply in the third battle through signicantly increasing the probabilities that
state (1; 1) will be reached. As a result, for eort elicitation purpose, the
higher the r is, the higher prize v(1) should be in order to oset the stronger
momentum/discouragement eect and better balance the contest.
The magnitudes of the above positive and negative eects all depend on
contest technology r. In particular, an increase in v(1) is more eective in mit-
igating the momentum eect in the second battle when the contest technology
gets more discriminatory (i.e., r increases). We therefore check D(; r) to eval-
uate carefully the net eect of v(2) on the aggregate eort for any r 2 (0; 2]
for a clear trade-o.
1.3.2 Case 2: r > 2
To consider the remaining case of r > 2, analogous to Denition 1.3(ii) for
Case 1, we introduce in the following Denition 1.5 prize subsets V4 and V5,
whose union equals the whole set V . Considering V4 and V5 separately allows
us determine which player has higher incentive to win battle 2 so that the
corresponding equilibrium given by Lemma 1.1 (iii) can be adopted for solving
battle 2.
Denition 1.5. 8r > 2, V = [5i=4Vi, where V4 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : v(2)  
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v(1)  v(1)  v(0)g and V5 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : v(2)  v(1)  v(1)  v(0)g.
In Lemmas A.4 and A.5 (in Appendix A.2), we provide the expected aggre-
gate eort and then characterize the optimal prizes in V4 and V5, respectively.
Combining the results, we can identify the optimal prize structures for each
r > 2. Therefore, we have Theorem 1.2 in the following.
Theorem 1.2. When r > 2, the maximum aggregate eort of 1 is induced by
any prize structure (0; 1  v(2); v(2); 1), 8v(2) 2 [2
3
; 1].
Theorem 1.2 illustrates that for the high range of r 2 (2;1), a whole span
of battle prizes, ranging from winner-take-all to proportional division rule, is
optimal. This result is in fact intuitive. When r moves into a higher range,
i.e., r  2, players react so sensitively to incentive that their rents are fully
dissipated under any eligible prize structure.
1.3.3 An alternative interpretation: battle prize and
grand contest prize
The optimal prize structures described above can be conveniently interpreted
using uniform battle prizes and a grand contest prize. A player gets a battle
prize vb whenever he wins an individual battle, and a grand winner who wins at
least two battles gets a grand contest prize or a punishment vg.
22 We also allow
an entry subsidy v0 to both players. Under this alternative prize structure, a
player receives a prize v0 if he wins no battle; he receives a prize v0 + vb is he
22We allow a negative contest prize vg.
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wins a single battle; he receives a prize v0 + 2vb + vg if he wins two battles;
and he receives a prize v0 + 3vb + vg if he wins all three battles.
For any eligible prize structure fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g that satises restric-
tions (1:1); (1:2) and (1:3) in the original setup, we next identify a unique
prize structure (v0; vb; vg) that satises budget constraint 3vb + vg + 2v0 = 1
and generates the identical eective rewards for every possible contingency of
contest states. Let
v(0) = v0; (1.6)
v(1) = v0 + vb; (1.7)
v(2) = v0 + 2vb + vg; and (1.8)
v(3) = v0 + 3vb + vg: (1.9)
Solving this linear equation system, we obtain that v0 = v(0), vb = v(1) 
v(0) and vg = v(2)   v(1)   (v(1)   v(0)), which satises automatically the
budget constraint: 2v0 + 3vb + vg = 2v(0) + 3(v(1)   v(0)) + v(2)   v(1)  
(v(1)  v(0)) = v(2) + v(1) = 1.23
Since each player faces the same prize spread across the two prize structures
at every state of the contest, each player exerts the same eort across the two
setups at each contingency along the path of the contest. We thus establish the
equivalence between any eligible prize structure fv(n); n = 0; 1; 2; 3g and the
combination of a entry fee/subsidy v0, a grand contest prize vg, and uniform
battle prizes vb with v0 = v(0), vb = v(1)   v(0), and vg = 1   3v(1) + v(0).
23Note that when v(0) = 0, we have vg < 0 if and only if v(1) >
1
3 , but it never occurs
for the optimal prize allocation when v(1)  13 .
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And note that this equivalence result has nothing to do with the optimality of
the prize structure.
Applying the equivalence result above, we therefore have the following
implementation result for the optimal prize structure identied in Theorems
1.1 and 1.2.
Theorem 1.3. 8r > 0, the optimal design can be implemented by a sequential
best-of-three contest with a uniform battle prize vb (r) = v

r(1)  13 to each
battle winner and a grand contest prize vg(r) = 1   3vr(1)  0 to the grand
winner who wins at least two battles.
In this alternative setting, we could rewrite the economic intuitions behind
Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 as follows. Note that optimality of v(0) = 0 corre-
sponds to v0 = 0, the main trade-o therefore lies between the battle prizes
and the grand prize. More precisely, a (> 0) increase in battle prize vb comes
together with a three-time drop in contest prize vg. To better understand the
optimal allocations, we illustrate how battle prizes and grand prize contribute
to aggregate eort respectively. To begin with, suppose there is an increase in
battle prizes, it could raise eort supply through multiple channels: First, it di-
rectly contributes to higher eective prize spreads in component battles, which
therefore induce higher eort supply in each battle. Moreover, such change
will cause \ripple eects" on players' eort supply in later stages: In battle 2
where players' incentives are asymmetric, a large battle prize encourages the
low-incentive player, the loser of the rst battle, to ght. On one hand, this
in turn raises the eort from the winner of the rst battle in battle 2 as well.
On the other hand, this mitigates the well-established discourage eect so that
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the contest will be more balance in battle 2, and then the grand winner will
be more likely determined only after the third battle has been fought. Conse-
quently, the third-stage contest becomes more likely competitive, due to the
grand prize.
We now turn to the eects of the grand prize. Fix the path of the con-
test, an increase in the grand contest prize raises players' eort supply in all
stages, especially for the stage contest in which both players have symmetric
incentives, e.g., the rst stage where the state is (0; 0) and third stage when
the state is (1; 1). At (0; 0), a large grand prize increases players' eort indi-
rectly through increasing players' incentive to ght for the status, for being
the winner of the rst battle who will more likely win the grand prize. A
grand prize contributes directly at the state (1; 1) through increasing players'
prize spreads three-time more than battle prizes. However, changing grand
prize aects the path of the whole contest. A high grand prize strengthens
the momentum/discouragement eect, since the winner of the rst battle will
be motivated by a large grand prize. Consequently, the contest will be more
imbalanced in second stage, and therefore the contest then has less chance
to reach (1; 1), at which grand prize is signicantly eective. In sum, a high
grand prize makes itself less contributive in late stages because it favours
imbalanced states, (2; 0) or (0; 2), meanwhile, battle prizes can mitigate the
momentum/discouragement eect to balance the contest.
We emphasize that the higher discriminatory power r is, the more miti-
gation is needed in battle 2 to oset the stronger momentum/discouragement
eect, and the stronger the mitigation provided by battle prize is. Higher
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battle prize thus serves the purpose. Note that under a higher discrimina-
tory power r, eort is more eective in determining the winner, and therefore
players react more sensitively to prizes.
When discriminatory power r stays low, momentum or discouragement
eect is weaker. There is no need to provide battle prizes to mitigate discour-
agement eect for eort elicitation. Even without the battle prizes, the contest
will more likely reach state (1; 1), where the grand prize plays its role. Even
with battle prizes, especially in the second-stage contest, players react insen-
sitively, and therefore the mitigation of discouragement eect is still weak. In
this case, grand prize dominates, which results in the optimality of a maximum
grand prize with zero battle prizes. As the discriminatory power r moves into
the intermediate range, battle prizes get more important and eective in mit-
igating discourage eect in battle 2, which renders the optimality of positive
battle prizes that increase with r. When r falls into the higher range, i.e.,
r  2, we have a special situation, where rents are fully dissipated in the rst
battle, in which the two players' prize spreads are symmetric. As a result, any
eligible prize structure yields the same level of total eort supply.
Based on Theorems 1.1 to 1.3, we have the following observation regarding
the optimal prize-allocation rule, which says that the proportional-division
rule is, in general, not optimal. In other words, in multi-battle contests, the
optimal prize-allocation rule should in principle give an additional reward to
the grand winner of the whole contest. In addition, the magnitude of this
additional reward (or grand prize) varies with the discriminatory power r of
the corresponding contest technology: When r < 2, i.e., players' eort is
36
not eective, the lower r is, the higher the addition reward vg(r) should be;
when r  2, players' eort is so eective that organizer can fully extract their
surplus by either battle prizes or grand prize, in this case, any feasible prize
structure (vg(r); v

b (r)) with v

g(r) 2 [0; 1] is optimal, and feasibility implies




Corollary 1.1. 8r > 0, we always have the optimal grand prize vg(r) 2 [0; 1]
and battle prizes vb (r) 2 [0; 13 ]. Moreover, vg(r) evolves gradually from 1 to 0,
and vb (r) evolves gradually from 0 to
1
3
when r 2 (0; 2); any (vg(r); vb (r)) with




is optimal when r  2.
1.4 Team contests with pairwise battles
In Section 1.3, we analyzed a three-battle contest between two players. We
illustrated that the need to mitigate the momentum/discouragement eect in
such environment plays a crucial role in determining the optimal prize struc-
ture. Battle prizes are optimal only if the discriminatory power r of the contest
technology becomes relatively high such that the momentum/discouragement
eect looms large. In this section, we reinforce this point by further study-
ing an alternative environment with sequential battles, where the momen-
tum/discouragement eect, however, does not exist.
In this section, we study a three-battle contest with two teams of three
players each. Battles are sequentially played, and history is observed by all
players. Each battle is fought between two players from opposing teams, and
each player from a team plays only one battle. Dierent from dynamic contests
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between two same players, in this team contest, each team member cares only
about the nal reward and his own eort cost in his own battle. The prize
from the team's winning the contest is assumed to be a public good among
team members.
This environment of team contests with multiple pairwise battles was rst
studied by Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015) for the purpose of equilibrium analysis of a
large class of contest technologies of homogeneity-of-degree-zero while adopting
the winner-take-all prize-allocation rule. Hafner (2015) further carries out the
equilibrium analysis in a tug-of-war variant of this environment while assuming
all-pay-auction technology and a winner-take-all prize-allocation rule.
We adopt the same prize-allocation framework as specied in Section 1.2:
v(n), n 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g denotes the prize allocated to each team based on their
number of wins. All three players in a team evaluate the prize at v(n), as the
prize is a public good within a team. Alternatively, the players within a same
team can equally split the prize their team wins. This alternative prize-sharing
rule does not aect the optimal prize allocation.
Based on the insights of Fu, Lu, and Pan (2015), both involved players
have a common prize spread in each battle, regardless of the previous out-
come. However, depending on the magnitude of discriminatory power r, the
equilibrium bidding strategy takes two dierent forms. Below we show that
a pure equilibrium is described by Lemma 1.1(i) in the rst case for r  2,
and a mixed equilibrium by Lemma 1.1(iii) in the second case for r > 2. The
procedure for deriving the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is standard.24
24The uniqueness of the subgame perfect equilibrium is discussed after Lemma 1.
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We show that, when r  2, the expected total eort is TE1T = 3r4 (v(2)  v(0))
in the team contest in Lemma A.6 (in Appendix 1.3), and when r > 2, the
expected total eort is TE2T =
3
2
(v(2)   v(0)) in the team contest in Lemma
A.7 (in Appendix 1.3). Maximizing the total eort given by Lemmas A.6 and
A.7 under the required constraints for v(n) yields the optimal prize structure
(v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)) = (0; 0; 1; 1). Therefore, we have the following result.
Theorem 1.4. Winner-take-all is the unique optimal prize structure in dy-
namic team contest with pairwise battles.
We thus conclude that the optimal prize-allocation rule can be dramatically
dierent across contests played between the same two players and two teams
of multiple players. When the discriminatory power r is low (i.e., r  r), both
types of contests require winner-take-all as the optimal prize-allocation rule.
When discriminatory power r is in the middle range (i.e., r 2 (r; 2)), a team
contest still requires a winner-take-all prize allocation for eort maximization,
while the contest between two same individual players requires awarding posi-
tive prizes to a player who wins even a single battle. When the discriminatory
power r is in the high range (i.e. r  2), a winner-take-all prize-allocation rule
still uniquely maximizes the total eort supply in team contest, while a whole
span of prize-allocation rules, ranging from winner-take-all to proportional-
division rule, is optimal in a contest between two individual players.
Unlike individual contests studied in Section 1.3, since momentum (or dis-
couragement) eect does not appear in the team contests, there is no need to
mitigate such eect by awarding positive battle prizes. Our analysis of team
contests further reinforces the insight that it is the mitigation of the momen-
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tum/discouragement eect that leads to the optimality of positive battle prizes
in contests between two individuals.
1.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we fully characterize the optimal contingent prize-allocation
rule in sequential-play three-battle contests between two same players or two
teams with three players each. The full spectrum of contest technologies in
the Tullock family are accommodated in our analysis. The optimal design can
be implemented by a best-of-three contest with uniform battle prizes and a
grand contest prize.
A winner-take-all best-of-three (i.e., a party wins all prize money if he wins
more than two battles) induces the maximal total expected eort for contests
between teams. When the battles are between two same individual players,
the discriminatory power of the contest technology plays a crucial role in de-
termining the optimal prize-allocation rule. Specically, when discriminatory
power is in the low range, a winner-take-all best-of-three contest remains opti-
mal. When the discriminatory power is in the intermediate range, the optimal
battle prize becomes positive, and then strictly increases with the discrimi-
natory power and reaches one third at the maximum. In other words, the
optimal prize structure evolves gradually and continuously from winner-take-
all to proportional division rule as the contest technology becomes more and
more discriminatory. When the discriminatory power falls in the high range,
a whole span of allocation rules in between winner-take-all and proportional
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division induces the maximal total expected eort.
The dierence in optimal prize structures across the two contest environ-
ments reects the dierent dynamics in multi-battle contests between two indi-
viduals and two teams. A positive prize for a single win (or, equivalently, a bat-
tle prize) can be optimal in dynamic multi-battle contests between two individ-
uals mainly because it functions to mitigate the momentum/discouragement
eect in such contests. A zero battle prize turns out to be optimal in dynamic
contests between two teams, since the momentum/discouragement eect does
not exist in such team setting as shown in Fu, Lu and Pan (2015), and therefore
there is no need to provide positive battle prize for mitigation.
In this paper, we focus on sequential-play three-battle contests. The in-
sights obtained extend to the design of simultanous-play multi-battle con-
tests. One can verify that a winner-take-all best-of-three remains optimal
for simultanous-play three-battle team contests, in which the momentum (or
discouragement) eect is not a concern.25 For the same reason, one can rea-
sonably expect that a winner-take-all best-of-three contest is optimal when
the battles are played simultaneously between two individuals.26
Our ndings provide a rationale from the perspective of eort elicitation
for the commonly adopted winner-take-all prize allocation in dynamic multi-
battle contests, as well as the practice of setting intermediate prizes on many
25The symmetric equilibrium in which players adopt the same strategy, is easy to charac-
terize for all discriminatory power r > 0.
26The technical diculties of analyzing simultanous-play three-battle contests lie in the
equilibrium characterizations of contests between two same players. The procedure of
Szentes and Rosenthal (2003) can be adapted for equilibrium construction in all-pay auc-
tions. The method of Klumpp and Polborn (2006) can be extended to analyze equilib-
rium when component battles are modelled as a Tullock contest with discriminatory power
r 2 (0; 1].
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occasions in a single integrated model. In particular, our analysis sets an upper
bound on the maximum prize for the player with a single win: Its optimal level
should never go beyond one third of the total prize budget. In other words, the
optimal prize-allocation rule should, in principle, give an additional reward to
the grand winner of the whole contest.
These results generate immediate implications for optimal reward design in
labor competitions involving multi-dimensional indicators. Our results estab-
lish that the best use of performance indicators on multiple dimensions (i.e.,
winning outcomes in dierent battles) should, in general, involve an indicator
of grand overall performance (i.e., the winning outcome of the whole contest),
which eectively aggregates all dimensional information. This means that in
general all dimensional information should be utilized at least to some extent







It has long been recognized in the literature that in rst-price auctions with a
stochastic number of bidders, the information disclosed by the seller over the
number of bidders directly aects entrants' bidding behaviors. The seller can
thus use an appropriate disclosure policy as an eective instrument to control
information release for her own interests. In particular, McAfee and McMillan
(1987) and Matthews (1987) compare full-disclosure and full-concealment poli-
cies, and nd that full concealment generates higher expected revenue when
bidders are risk averse.
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Clearly, there are many feasible disclosure policies other than full disclo-
sure and full concealment, which have been studied by McAfee and McMillan
(1987) and Matthews (1987). A question naturally arises: If we allow a more
general class of policies, then what is the seller's optimal choice and how a
policy aects the bidders' expected utility? In the context of online auctions,
an auctioneer can choose whether or not to display the actual number of par-
ticipating bidders. In fact, the auctioneer has more choices. For example, she
could adopt a cuto policy of disclosing the number of bidders if and only if
it is above a certain threshold. In this paper, we examine this seller-optimal
disclosure policy by comparing across all the feasible policies accommodated in
a Bayesian persuasion framework. In particular, we will show how the optimal
disclosure policy would depend on bidders' risk attitude. We will also study
how the bidders' ex ante expected utility is aected by the disclosure policies.
We consider a rst-price auction of a single object in the setting of McAfee
and McMillan (1987). All bidders are symmetric ex ante, and their private
values are their private information. We assume that bidders' preference ex-
hibits constant absolute risk aversion or risk loving. All the players, including
the seller and the bidders, have a common prior belief that each subgroup of
bidders will be selected by nature as entrants with a group-specic probability.
We assume that any two subgroups with the same size are selected as entrants
with the same probability. After bidders' participation, the seller observes the
number of entrants, however, each bidder only observes his own entry status
unless the seller discloses more information. To best utilize her future superior
information, the seller designs her optimal disclosure policy for revealing infor-
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mation about the number of actual bidders, and announces the policy publicly
before nature makes the move. Following the Bayesian persuasion approach,
we model the seller's disclosure policy as a signal-generating mechanism con-
tingent on the realized number of actual entrants. Applying the Bayesian
persuasion approach requires the seller's commitment power for her choice of
disclosure policy. The sellers often have such commitment power in many
situations. As the auction rules are typically announced in advance, a seller
would follow the committed rule to maintain her credibility, even when ex post
deviations are protable. Moreover, in many online auctions, the disclosure
policy is usually pre-programmed by the hosting web-pages, and deviation is
usually infeasible.
To determine the seller's optimal disclosure policy, one must understand
how a public signal aects entrants' bidding strategies. Since the entrant-
generating process selects any two groups of bidders of same size with equal
chance, any public signal realization will lead to a common posterior belief
about the state of the contest (i.e., the number of entrants) among all en-
trants. Consequently, we focus on entrants' symmetric bidding strategy. In
our problem, an entrant observes his own entry status in addition to the pub-
licly released signal. Therefore, an entrant would update his own belief by
combining these two sources of information. For a given disclosure policy, we
then decompose an entrant's belief-updating process into two steps. In the
rst step, we derive the belief of a bidder who observes the signal realization
but not his own entry status. Following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), all
feasible distributions of rst-step beliefs can be completely characterized. In
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the second step, we further express an entrant's posterior belief that bases on
both the signal realization and his own entry status. This step delivers all the
feasible entrants' common posteriors.
To solve for the seller's optimal disclosure policy, it is more convenient to
work on the rst-step belief. Therefore, by the relationship between the rst-
and second-step beliefs, we write the expected revenue under a particular signal
realization as a function of the rst-step belief. More importantly, we establish
that the seller's ex ante expected revenue can still be computed by aggregating
over the distribution of the rst-step beliefs. The seller's optimization problem
is thus to maximize the expected revenue by searching through all feasible
distributions of rst-step beliefs, which has been characterized by Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011).
To determine the optimal policy, we conduct the concavication analysis
as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Aumann and Maschler (1995). For
this purpose, we examine the Hessian matrix of the expected revenue with
respect to the rst-step belief. The entrants' equilibrium bidding strategy
and the seller's expected revenue under a common belief can be characterized
explicitly, which facilitates the calculation of the concerned Hessian matrix.
We therefore are able to determine the deniteness of the concerned Hes-
sian matrix, through which we identify the optimal policy. When bidders are
risk averse (resp. risk loving), the Hessian matrix is negative (resp. posi-
tive) semi-denite. Therefore, the seller's expected revenue is weakly concave
(resp. convex) in terms of entrants' common posterior, which means that full
concealment (resp. full disclosure) is the optimal policy. When bidders are
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risk neutral, the resulting Hessian matrix is a zero matrix, and therefore any
disclosure policy yields the same expected revenue.
In addition, we show that the ex ante utility of each potential bidder is
the same across all disclosure policies, regardless of the bidders' risk attitude.
Therefore, the revenue-maximizing policy Pareto-dominates other policies, and
the identied seller-optimal policy also maximizes the ex ante expected total
surplus of all players.
We further study an alternative rst price auction environment, in which
bidders are risk neutral while their disutility of payment is nonlinear. We nd
our procedure still applies. When bidders' disutility function is convex (resp.
concave), the seller's optimal policy is to fully conceal (resp. disclose). The
same results are shown to hold for an all-pay auction with risk neutral bidders
and nonlinear disutility of eort.1
Our paper is most closely related to McAfee and McMillan (1987) and
Matthews (1987). They compare two polar policies (i.e., full disclosure and
no disclosure) in the setting of rst-price sealed-bid auctions with risk-averse
bidders. They nd that the seller prefers to conceal information about the
number of entrants. Our results are consistent with theirs, as we nd that
full concealment is indeed the optimal policy among a whole range of feasible
disclosure policies when bidders are constant absolute risk averse. Dierenti-
ating from their studies, we adopt a Bayesian persuasion perspective, which
makes it feasible to compare full disclosure with any partial disclosure pol-
icy, and establish the optimality of the two polar policies among a complete
1Please refer to Appendix B.2 for detailed analysis of all-pay auction.
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family of disclosure policies described by signal-generating mechanisms. More-
over, our study further covers the cases with constant absolute risk loving and
risk-neutral bidders.
Stochastic entry has also been studied recently in the contest literature.
Lim and Matro (2009) and Fu, Jiao, and Lu (2011) adopt a Tullock contest
setting with stochastic entry and compare the full-revealing and full-concealing
policies from the perspective of the contest organizer. They nd that the
curvature of the characteristic function of the contest success function plays a
key role in determining the preferred policy. Chen, Jiang and Knyazev (2015)
compare the full-revealing and full-concealing policies in an all-pay auction
setting with stochastic entry. Feng and Lu (2016) further adopt a Bayesian
persuasion approach and study the optimal disclosure policy in a complete-
information imperfectly discriminatory contest with stochastic entry. They
demonstrate that if the characteristic function of the contest technology is
strictly concave (resp. convex), the contest organizer's optimal policy is to
fully reveal (resp. conceal) the number of actual contestants.
Our study is facilitated by the recent development in the Bayesian per-
suasion approach. Brocas and Carrillo (2007), Rayo and Segal (2010) and
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) study how a sender strategically releases in-
formation to a receiver. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) formulate their prob-
lem in a convenient form by writing the sender's ex ante payo as a function of
the distribution of posterior beliefs, and develop a concavication technique to
identify the optimal persuasion. Wang (2013) studies persuasions with mul-
tiple receivers in a voting game. Chan, Li, and Wang (2015) further study
48
a more sophisticated Bayesian persuasion game between a sender and a set
of voters. Li and Norman (2015) consider both sequential and simultaneous
moves in a class of multi-sender persuasion games. Taneva (2016) considers a
model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the
information structure about a payo relevant state. She fully characterizes the
designer's optimal choice of information structure in a two-state, two-agent,
and two-action environment. Zhang and Zhou (2016) apply the Bayesian per-
suasion approach in a Tullock contest to study how to optimally inuence an
uninformed contestant's belief about his opponent's valuation. Ely, Frankel,
and Kamenica (2015) further study optimal information disclosure to maxi-
mize expected suspense and surprise in dynamic environments. Our paper ex-
emplies another successful application of the Bayesian persuasion approach
in a well-known environment of rst-price auctions with multiple receivers and
an uncertain number of entrants.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we set up the
incomplete-information rst-price auction model with stochastic entry and risk
averse/loving bidders. In Section 2.3, we present the analysis of optimal dis-
closure policy in the environment of Section 2.2. In Section 2.4, we study an
alternative rst price auction environment, in which bidders are risk neutral
while their disutility of payment is nonlinear. Section 2.5 provides a con-
cluding remark. Appendix B.1 collects the proofs for the rst-price auction
environments, and Appendix B.2 studies the optimal disclosure policy in an
all-pay auction environment with risk neutral bidders and nonlinear disutility
of eort.
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2.2 The model setup
We consider a rst-price auction with a single item, M potential bidders,
and one seller. The bidders' private values are independently drawn from a
common cumulative distribution F () with density function f(), where f is
continuous and strictly positive on its support [0; x]. The values are bidders'
private information, while the value distribution is public information.
We assume that the bidders have the following exponential utility function.
Assumption 2.1. u(w) = 1 e
 w

;  2 ( 1;+1).
When  > 0, u() exhibits constant absolute risk aversion; when  < 0,
u() exhibits constant absolute risk loving. When  ! 0, u(w) converges to
u0(w) = w, which exhibits risk neutrality.
It is common knowledge among the potential bidders and the seller that a
subset A 2 2M will be selected by nature with probability 0(A) to participate
in the rst-price auction. We have
P
A22M 0(A) = 1. Therefore, f0(A);
8A 2 2Mg is common prior belief of all the players. We assume the following
assumption:
Assumption 2.2. (Symmetry in entry) 8A;A0 2 2M , if jAj = jA0j, we have
0(A) = 0(A
0).
Assumption 2.2 says that any two groups with the same size have the same
participating probability, which means that what will aect the participating
probability of a group is the size of the group, instead of the bidders' identities
in that group. In particular, it accommodates the case in which each contestant
has a xed and independent participating probability. Under Assumption 2.2,
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we can then focus on the bidders' belief about the number of entrants. Put it
dierently, when Assumption 2.2 violates, what matters is the bidders' belief
about the subsets of entrants rather than belief about the numbers of entrants,
as a public disclosure policy may induce dierent posteriors.
In our model, we allow the seller to learn the number of entrants after
nature selects the participating group, however, an entrant only observes his
own participation status but not other entrants' participation, unless the seller
discloses additional information. All selected bidders bid simultaneously based
on their posterior beliefs about the number of actual bidders. The highest
bidder wins and pays his own bid. The losing bidders do not pay.
The seller aims to maximize her expected revenue by choosing how to dis-
close information about the actual number of bidders. The seller's disclosure
policy aects entrants' bidding behavior by inuencing their posterior beliefs.
Let S = 
 = f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg.2 A disclosure policy of the seller is described
by f(jN)gN2
 over the signal space S, for each possible cardinality N(2 
)
of a participating group. In the event that N bidders participate, a publicly
observed signal s 2 S is generated following the distribution (jN). In par-
ticular, policy (sjN) = 1f(s;N)js=Ng(s;N) leads to full disclosure, and policy
(sjN) = 1
M+1
, 8s;N , corresponds to full concealment.
We assume that the seller has precommitment power. In other words, the
seller will stick to any disclosure policy that has been preannounced before the
entrants' participation. This commitment power is required by the Bayesian
2As shown in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Zhang and Zhou (2015), it is without
loss of generality to assume that the size of the signal space is less than the minimum of the
size of action space and the state space. In our model, the action space is continuous and
the state space is 
 = f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg.
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persuasion approach we adopt in this paper.
2.3 The analysis of optimal disclosure policy
In this section, we present the analysis of optimal disclosure policies for the
Section 2.2 environment. In Section 2.3.1, we rst identify entrants' common
posterior belief conditional on a public signal realization generated by a disclo-
sure policy. In Section 2.3.2, assuming that entrants hold a common posterior,
we analyze their equilibrium behavior and calculate the expected revenue. In
Section 2.3.3, we show that the observability of the actual number of entrants
by the seller after bidders' entries makes no dierence to the formulation of
her expected revenue. Combining the results in Sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.3, we
formulate the seller' optimization problem on her choice of disclosure policy.
In Section 2.3.4, we solve for the optimal disclosure policies from both the
perspectives of seller and buyers.
2.3.1 Belief updating
A representative entrant i observes the signal realization s and his own entry
status, and forms his own posterior belief (js; i) over all possible numbers of
entrants. Given that bidder i is an entrant, what is his belief about the actual
entrants without any additional information? 8Ai 2 2M , where i 2 Ai, given





and 0(Aji) = 0, 8A 2 2M such that i =2 A.
Conditional on the additional information s, an entrant i0s posterior belief
(Ajs; i) about A 2 2M is as follows: (Ajs; i) = 0;8i =2 A; and
(Aijs; i) = (sjjAij)0(Ai)P
8Ai22M (sjjAij)0(Ai)
; 8Ai.
We can then further identify his belief (N js; i) about N 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg
after observing s and his own entry as follows: (0js; i) = 0 and




Under Assumption 2.2, no entrant can deduce more information than other
entrants based on his own entry status and the public signal s. Therefore, this
simplication assumption enables us to focus our analysis on the belief about
the number of entrants. In the following lemma, we establish the relationship
between an entrant's posterior belief and the signal realization. Since (N js; i)
does not depend on the identity of an entrant, we can denote the common belief
by (N js; e), where e is for entrants. A common belief across all entrants
not only simplies the belief-updating process, but also greatly facilitates the
equilibrium analysis.
We let 0(N) =
P




, 8N 2 
 stand for an entrant's updated belief based only
on the signal realization s, without knowing his own entry status.
Lemma 2.1. Under Assumption 2.2, every entrant observing a signal s and
53
his own entry holds a common posterior belief
(N js; e) = e(N js) = Ns(N)MP
N 0=1
N 0s(N 0)
;8N 2 f0; 1; :::;Mg: (2.1)
The proof for Lemma 2.1 is in Appendix B.1. Lemma 2.1 establishes the
connection between the common posterior belief f(js; e)g of entrants and the
belief fs()g, which is updated only upon signal s. It shows that f(js; e)g
can be fully pinned down by fs()g. This connection will be used to show, in
Proposition 2.1, that expected revenue can be written as a function of belief
fs()g, which greatly facilitates the search for the optimal disclosure policy.
Since the signal s aects (N js; e) solely through s, we use e(js) here-
after to denote belief (js; e) to simplify notation.
2.3.2 Symmetric equilibrium under a given common be-
lief
Given a public signal s generated under a given disclosure policy, under As-
sumption 2.2, entrants form a common posterior belief about the number of
participants, as established in Section 2.3.1. We next identify the symmetric
equilibrium bidding function of the entrants for any given common posterior
belief fe(js); N = 1; 2; :::;Mg.
Risk-averse and risk-loving bidders:  6= 0
We focus on characterizing the unique symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Given participating bidders' common posterior belief e(js),
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let B(x; e(js)) be the corresponding equilibrium bidding function, which is
strictly increasing.
Lemma 2.2. For  6= 0, if participating bidders hold the same posterior belief
e(N js) and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold, the entrants' unique symmetric
equilibrium bidding strategy is















Without loss of generality, we assume that 0 2 int(M), where M =
f 2 RM j(N)  0; 8N 2 




Combining Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, we have the following proposition, which
shows that the equilibrium strategy can be alternatively written as a function
of belief s.
Proposition 2.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, for  6= 0, given a disclo-
sure policy , conditional on a signal realization s, entrants' unique symmetric











(N   1)etFN 2(t)f(t)dt]: (2.2)
3When 0 =2 int(M ), we can simply reduce the dimension of M as long as 0 is not
degenerate. However, we exclude degenerate cases.
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Recall that s(N) = (N js) = (sjN)0(N)MP
N0=0
(sjN 0)0(N 0)
;8N 2 f0; 1; :::;Mg is a
bidder's updated belief based only on the signal realization s (without knowing
his own entry status). Alternatively, we can write the bidding function given
by (2:2) explicitly:

















We now turn to the case where all bidders are risk neutral. In this case, all
bidders have the same utility function
u(w) = w:
Analogous to the equilibrium analysis for risk-averse bidders, we solve for
the unique pure strategy equilibrium bidding function B(x; e(js)) of a risk-
neutral entrant with belief e(js) and value x 2 [0; x].
Lemma 2.3. When bidders are risk neutral, if participating bidders hold the
same posterior belief e(js) and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold, entrants'
unique symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is
MX
N=1








Combining Lemmas 2.1 and 2.3, we have the following proposition, which
gives the equilibrium strategy as a function of belief s.
Proposition 2.2. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, when bidders are risk neu-
tral, given a disclosure policy , conditional on a signal realization s, entrants'











(N   1)tFN 2(t)f(t)dt: (2.3)












2.3.3 The seller's problem
In our setting, the seller observes the number of the entrants (i.e., the true
state) after nature selects the set of participants. This is dierent from Ka-
menica and Gentzkow's (2011) setup, in which both the sender and the receiver
do not observe the true state. Nevertheless, we next establish that Kamenica
and Gentzkow's formula for the sender's ex ante expected payo remains ap-
plicable in our context, in which the seller is the sender and the bidders are
the receivers.
Let  denote the belief of a bidder who only observes the public signal but
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not his entry status. Conditional on N and , the sender's payo is


















The following lemma gives the seller's ex ante expected revenue as a func-
tion of distribution  for the belief .
Lemma 2.4. Given a disclosure policy  that induces a distribution  for the
belief  of a bidder who only observes the public signal but not his own entry
status, the seller's ex ante expected revenue equals
ER():













and  denotes the distribution of posteriors . The above usual constraint on
 , as specied in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), applies.
We would like to emphasize that Lemma 2.4 is also applicable in the envi-
ronments of Section 2.4 and Appendix B.2, in which the equilibrium bidding
strategy B(x; e(j)) in R() takes dierent forms though.
2.3.4 The optimal disclosure policy
We will rst solve for the seller's optimal disclosure policy in Theorem 2.1. We
will further study how the bidders' ex ante utility depends on the disclosure
policies in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, we have
(i) the optimal disclosure policy is full concealment if bidders are risk averse,
i.e.,  > 0;
(ii) the optimal disclosure policy is full disclosure if bidders are risk loving,
i.e.,  < 0; and
(iii) the seller's ex ante expected revenue is invariant to the disclosure policy
if bidders are risk neutral.
We prove Theorem 2.1 by showing that R() is concave (resp. convex)
when  > 0 (resp.  < 0). The proof for Theorem 2.1 is relegated to Appendix
B.1.
The optimality of full concealment policy is explained by what McAfee and
McMillan (1987) called the bid-dispersion eect: revealing information results
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in a higher variance and therefore lowers the revenue on average. Theorem
2.1 shows that this bid-dispersion eect works when bidders are risk averse
(i.e.,  > 0), but not for risk-loving bidders (i.e.,  < 0), and what drives
the bid-dispersion eect is the convexity of R(). In fact, whether a higher
variance is protable for the seller, all depends on the convexity/concavity of
R(), which is further determined by the bidders' risk attitude.
When bidders are risk averse, the seller's ex ante revenue R() increases
less in response to a more pessimistic belief , i.e., when entrants believe that
more likely there is a large number of entrants. To see the reason, recall that,
in a rst-price auction, the risk-averse bidders will bid more aggressively than
risk-neutral bidders in order to secure a win. In addition, a bidder never bids
more than his true valuation in rst-price auctions. Consequently, risk-averse
bidders tend to react less sensitively to a more pessimistic belief , compared to
risk neutral bidders. Therefore, the seller's ex ante revenue R() responses less
sensitively to a more pessimistic belief , that is, R() is concave in , when
 > 0. The intuitions behind Theorem 2.1 (ii) and (iii) can be analogously
illustrated.
In the next theorem, we study how a disclosure policy aects the bidders'
expected utility. We show that a bidder's ex ante expected utility actually
does not depend on the disclosure policy in our context, regardless of the risk
attitude of the bidders. This result immediately means that the seller-optimal
policy must Pareto dominate other policies, and it renders the highest expected
total surplus for all players.
Theorem 2.2. (i) The ex ante utility of each potential bidder is invariant to
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the disclosure policy.
(ii) The seller-optimal disclosure policy is Pareto dominant.
2.4 First-price auction with nonlinear disutil-
ity of payment
In this section, we study an alternative rst-price auction environment, which
only diers from the original setup of Section 2.2 in that bidders are risk-
neutral but their disutility of payment is nonlinear. Specically, the winner
suers a disutility of g(b) if he pays his bid b, where function g() : R+ ! R+
is twice continuously dierentiable, g0() > 0 and g(0) = 0. The same value
distribution for bidders and the same entrant-generating process as specied
in Section 2.2 prevail. To be consistent with the analysis for the original setup
and avoid introducing more notations, we use the same set of notations as in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
Given a representative participant i0s posterior belief about the number of
the participants e(js) and his value x 2 [0; x], he maximizes his expected
utility by choosing his bid b :
max
b
U(b; x) := Ee(js)[F
N 1(B 1(b))(x  g(b))]:
The following lemma characterizes the unique symmetric pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. The proof is relegated to the Appendix B.1.
Lemma 2.5. If participating bidders hold the same posterior belief e(js)
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and Assumption 2.2 holds, entrants' symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy











As in Section 2.3, we assume 0 2 int(M), where M = f 2 RM j(N) 
0; 8N 2 




Combining Lemmas 2.1 and 2.5, we have the following proposition, which
shows that the equilibrium strategy can be alternatively written as a function
of belief s.
Proposition 2.3. Under Assumption 2.2, given a disclosure policy , condi-












(N   1)FN 2(t)f(t)tdt]: (2.5)
Alternatively, we can write the bidding function given by (2.5) explicitly:












The sender's optimization problem can be formulated in the same way
as in Section 2.3.3 except that the equilibrium bidding strategy now takes a
dierent form. We solve for the optimal disclosure policy and summarize the
results in the following Theorem. The proof of Theorem 2.3 is relegated to
Appendix B.1.
Theorem 2.3. When Assumption 2.2 holds and bidders are risk neutral, we
have
(i) the optimal disclosure policy is full concealment if g is convex;
(ii) the optimal disclosure policy is full disclosure if g is concave;
(iii) any policy renders the same total expected revenue if g is linear; and
(iv) the ex ante utility of each potential bidder is invariant to the disclosure
policy.
The same set of results holds for all-pay auctions with risk neutral bidders
and nonlinear bidding costs. To save space, the detailed analysis is presented
in Appendix B.2.
2.5 Concluding remarks
Our study shows that the Bayesian persuasion approach can be successfully
applied to examine the optimal policy for disclosing the number of actual
participants in rst-price auctions with stochastic entry. We nd that the
bidders' risk attitude plays a crucial role in determining the optimal disclo-
sure policy. If bidders are constant absolute risk averse (resp. loving), the
seller's optimal policy is to fully reveal (resp. conceal) the actual number of
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participants. If bidders are risk neutral, any disclosure policy yields the seller
the same expected revenue. In addition, we show that the ex ante expected
utility of each potential bidder is the same across the disclosure policies. As a
result, the seller-optimal policy Pareto-dominates other policies. Our analysis
extends to alternative rst-price and all-pay auction environments with risk
neutral bidders and nonlinear disutility of payment or eort.4 When bidders'
disutility function is convex (resp. concave), the seller's optimal policy is full
concealment (resp. disclosure).
In this paper, entry is exogenously stochastic and disclosure policy does
not aect bidders' entry behavior. In some situations, bidders incur an entry
cost to participate. Therefore, entry is endogenously stochastic, and dierent
disclosure policies may induce dierent entry behavior. As a result, the op-
timal disclosure policy must balance bidders' participation and bid-eliciting
from entrants. An intriguing issue is whether our ndings can be generalized
to the environment with endogenous entry|and if not, what would be the op-
timal policy to generate the highest expected revenue. We leave this to future
research.
4Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study all-pay auctions with incomplete information, and
allow linear and nonlinear eort cost functions. If stochastic entry is introduced into their
model, a similar procedure that used in this paper can be applied to study the optimal




Ex Ante Ecient Auctions with
Bi-Dimensional Private
Information on Values and
Entry Costs
3.1 Introduction
Endogenous entry of bidders has been widely identied as an important issue
in practice. In their study of the U.S. Minerals Management Service \wildcat
auctions", Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) nd that less than 25 percent
of eligible bidders participate in the auctions held from 1954 to 1970. For
the Texas Department of Transportation mowing contract auctions, Li and
Zheng (2009) report that only about 28 percent of plan-holders actually submit
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bids. Similar endogenous entry patterns have been reported by Bajari and
Hortacsu (2003) for online auctions, by Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011), Li and
Zhang (2010, 2014), and Roberts and Sweeting (2013) for timber auctions, by
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) for highway procurement and by Gentry and
Stroup (2014) for corporate takeover markets among many others.1
Ecient auction design with endogenous entry has attracted signicant
amount of attention in the literature. The ex ante eciency of a simple second-
price auction with a reserve price equal to seller's value has been conrmed in
a number of settings with one-dimensional private information. In particular,
Stegeman (1996) shows the eciency of the said auction for a setting where
bidders who are privately informed about their values need to incur xed entry
costs to participate in an auction. Levin and Smith (1994) establish the e-
ciency of the said auction when bidders need to incur a xed cost to discover
their values before they participate in an auction. Bergemann and Valimaki
(2002) study a setting where the bidders must decide how much to invest to
improve the distribution of their values; the eciency of the said auction also
survives their setting.2
In this paper, we study a setting where asymmetric bidders have two-
dimensional private information on their values and entry costs.3;4 This setting
1Fang and Tang (2014) proposed econometric methods for inferring bidders' risk attitudes
and estimating entry costs.
2The auction design literature with endogenous entry also considered revenue maximiza-
tion. This literature includes Milgrom (1981), Samuelson (1985), McAfee and McMillan
(1987), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993), Levin and Smith (1994), Ye (2007), Lu (2009, 2010),
Celik and Yilankaya (2009), Moreno and Wooders (2011), and Jehiel and Lamy (2015)
among many others.
3In a setting of two-dimensional private information with symmetric bidders, Xu, Levin
and Ye (2013) study the impact of resale on the eciency of a second price auction.
4The entry cost in this paper can also be treated as a communication cost as modelled
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diers from Stegeman (1996) by assuming that the entry costs are also private
information of the bidders. Several interesting questions arise immediately:
Do we have the existence of an ecient auction? If yes, what approach should
we take to identify it? How does this additional private information of the
entry costs aect its design? In particular, should the ecient auction favor
the entrants with higher values net of entry costs?
Due to the additional dimension of private costs, ecient auction design
becomes a bi-dimensional screening mechanism design problem. Rochet and
Chone (1998) point out the diculty of characterizing all implementable en-
dogenous entry equilibria for multi-dimensional screening problems. Thus it
would be challenging to identify an ecient auction in our two-dimensional
setting by adopting a conventional mechanism design approach.
An exploratory but more practical alternative is to adapt the procedures
of Levin and Smith (1994), Stegeman (1996) and Bergemann and Valimaki
(2002) in their one-dimensional settings to our bi-dimensional private infor-
mation setting. Their approaches share some common key insights for deriving
the ecient auctions. (1) The set of implementable entries is compact. (2)
Ignoring the individual rationality and incentive compatibility of the bidders,
the maximal expected total surplus for each entry is achieved by allocating the
object to the entrant (including the seller) with the highest value. (3) Such
dened maximal expected total surplus function is continuous on the compact
set of implementable entries. (4) The existence of an optimal entry (or in-
formation acquisition) that maximizes the maximal expected total surplus is
in Evans (2012).
67
guaranteed within the set of implementable entries. (5) The optimal entry
(or information acquisition) and the associated maximal expected total sur-
plus are implemented by the said simple second price auction. While one can
conjecture that their result on ex ante ecient auctions in the setting of one-
dimensional private information continues to hold in the two-dimensional case,
there are several diculties that are unique to the two-dimensional problem.
The central issue is that the domain of the social planner's maximization prob-
lem is not well identied in the two-dimensional setting. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the rst to identify this issue and provide a solution
by overcoming a number of diculties as being discussed below.
First, the set of implementable entries is of innite dimension and unknown
for our setting. In addition, its compactness is unclear. For the existence of
an optimal entry, we need to work on a carefully identied compact set of
entries that may be strictly bigger than the set of implementable entries. This
compact set has to be chosen with great care. One minimum requirement is
that the set must not miss the entries implemented by ecient auctions if they
exist. Since we have no idea about the ecient entries, we would want this
set to cover all implementable entries. On the other hand, there are costs for
making the set bigger since the risk that the resulted optimal entry goes beyond
the implementable set increases. For the purpose of selecting a right compact
set, we partially characterize the properties of the implementable entries by
adopting a mechanism design approach as in Myerson (1981). We nd that
any implementable entry must be described through a set of increasing and
continuous shutdown curves. Furthermore, the slopes of the shutdown curves
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must equal the expected winning probabilities of the participating types. This
result inspires us to identify a compact set of hypothetical entries that are
described by increasing entry curves satisfying a Lipschitz continuity condition.
Note that some of those hypothetical entries may not be implementable by any
mechanism.
Second, in order to establish the existence of an optimal entry in the iden-
tied compact set of hypothetical entries, we need to establish the continuity
of the maximal expected total surplus as a function on the identied innite
dimensional compact set of hypothetical entries. The required continuity is
obtained by applying the Dominated Convergence Theorem. Given this con-
tinuity, the classical Extreme Value Theorem implies that an optimal entry
within the identied compact set must exist to maximize the maximal expected
total surplus.
Third, since the identied compact set of hypothetical entries include many
non-implementable entries, we need to establish that an optimal entry is in-
deed implementable and must be implemented by an auction that is ex post
ecient.5 That is, even if an optimal entry exists, whether the optimal entry
and the associated maximal expected total surplus are implementable remains
to be investigated. We establish that every interior threshold type of bidders
that fall on the identied optimal shutdown curves must contribute zero to the
total surplus. Since the expected payo of the threshold types is equivalent
to their marginal contribution in a second-price auction with a reserve price
equal to the seller's valuation, this auction must implement the optimal entry.
5Here, ex post eciency means that the object is allocated to the entrant with the highest
value.
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In addition, this auction always allocates the object to the entrant with the
highest value.
The eciency of the second price auction thus follows. An immediate im-
plication is that any ecient auction must allocate the object to the entrant
with the highest value regardless of the entry costs. This result is somewhat
surprising as it implies that an ecient auction cannot favor the entrants with
lower entry costs in terms of ex post winning chances. The innovation in our
approach of the problem is to extend the unknown domain of implementable
entries to a compact domain so that the maximal expected total surplus func-
tion has the same maximum in both domains.
Our nding echoes that of Fang and Morris (2006). In a dierent bi-
dimensional private information setting where each bidder observes his own
private valuation as well as noisy signals about his opponents' private valu-
ation, Fang and Morris (2006) also establish the eciency of a second price
auction.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the auction
model with bi-dimensional types (value and entry cost) for bidders. Section 3.3
provides a partial characterization of implementable entry following a mech-
anism design approach. Section 3.4 studies a relaxed design problem where
the designer observes buyers' types. The designer who maximizes the total
expected surplus can direct buyers' entry, and he can directly allocate the ob-
ject to any entrant. The eligible entry set is carefully chosen according to the
characteristics of implementable entry and the requirement of being compact.
Section 3.5 establishes the ex ante ecient auction for our bi-dimensional set-
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ting. Appendix C contains some technical proofs.
3.2 The Model
There is one seller who wants to sell one indivisible object to N( 2) potential
bidders through an auction. We use N = f1; 2;    ; Ng to denote the set
of all potential bidders. The seller's valuation for the object is v0, which is
public information. Each bidder i's type is described by his private value of
the object vi and private participation cost ci, where vi and ci are bidder i's
private information. Here, ci can be any costs incurred for bid preparation
and bidding process, or opportunity costs of bidding. For i 2 N , the private
information ti = (ci; vi) is distributed on Ti = [ci; ci]  [vi; vi] following a
cumulative distribution function Fi(; ) with a density function fi(; ) > 0 on
Ti. The distributions Fi(; ) are public information. We assume that all the
ti are mutually independent across i 2 N . The seller and bidders are risk
neutral.
The timing of the auction is as follows.
Time 0: Nature reveals the set of potential bidders N , the seller's value
v0 and the distributions of the private values and participation costs, which
are public information. Each bidder i observes his private value vi and private
participation cost ci, i 2 N:
Time 1: The seller announces the rule of the auction. We assume that the
auction rule does not allocate the object to a nonparticipating bidder, and a
nonparticipant does not pay.
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Time 2: The bidders simultaneously and condentially make their partici-
pation decisions and announce their bids if they decide to participate. If bidder
i participates, he incurs his participation cost ci. If he does not participate,
he simply takes the outside opportunity and receives 0.
Time 3: The payos of the seller and the participating bidders are deter-
mined according to the announced rule at time 1.
We look for the ex ante ecient auction rule that maximizes the ex-
pected total surplus of the seller and bidders. Here, the expected total
surplus equals the dierence between the expected winner's value and the
expected entry costs of all the entrants.
Based on the semirevelation principle established in Stegeman (1996, Lemma
3.1), there is no loss of generality to derive the ex ante ecient mechanisms by
considering only the truthful direct semirevelation mechanisms. For a truthful
direct semirevelation mechanism, every participant reveals truthfully his type,
the nonparticipant do not announce their types.
We use a null message ; to denote the signal of a nonparticipant. In a
direct semirevelation mechanism, the message space is M =
QN
i=1Mi where
Mi = f[ci; ci] [vi; vi]g [ f;g is bidder i's message space. The outcome func-
tions announced by the seller accommodate all participation possibilities in
the following form: payment function xi(m) and winning probability function
pi(m) for bidder i; 8i 2 N , where m = (mi)Ni=1 is the message vector and
mi 2 Mi is the signal of bidder i. We denote the above mechanism by (p; x),
where p = (pi(m))
N
i=1 and x = (xi(m))
N
i=1, and p should satisfy the \feasibility"
restrictions: pi(m)  0; 8i 2 N; 8m 2 M , and
PN
i=1 pi(m)  1; 8m 2 M .
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Nonparticipating bidders have no chance to win the object and their payments
to the seller are zero, i.e., pi(m) = xi(m) = 0 if mi = ;; 8i 2 N .
For the reasons elaborated in the introduction, we will derive the ex ante
ecient auction following the procedure described there. A crucial step is to
partially characterize the implementable entries.
3.3 Partial Characterization of Implementable
Entries
The following lemma shows that any equilibrium entry must be characterized
by a shutdown curve for each potential bidder.6 Its proof will be given in the
Appendix.
Lemma 3.1. Any equilibrium entry that is induced by any auction mechanism
can be described through N increasing and continuous shutdown curves Ci(vi)
for i 2 N : [vi; vi] ! [ci; ci]; 8i 2 N . For bidder i with type (ci; vi), he
participates if ci < Ci(vi), and he does not participate if ci > Ci(vi).
Dene (vi`; v
i
u) to be the interval on which Ci(vi) falls into (ci; ci), if Ci() is
not always equal to ci or ci.
7 If Ci(vi)  ci, we let vi` = viu = vi; if Ci(vi)  ci,
we let vi` = v
i
u = vi.
Lemma 3.1 species the participation for the bidders whose types are not
6Unlike in Stegeman (1996) and Tan and Yilankaya (2006) where potential bidders par-
ticipate according to their entry thresholds that are points in the single dimensional value
spaces of bidders; in our setting potential bidders participate according to their shutdown
curves in their two dimensional spaces of values and entry costs.
7Note that Ci(vi)  ci 2 (ci; ci) cannot be an equilibrium shutdown curve.
73
on the shutdown curves. We can specify the participation of bidders whose
types are on the shutdown curves as follows:8 If vi` < v
i
u, we assume that
bidder i with types (Ci(vi); vi) where vi  vi` participates, and bidder i with
types (Ci(vi); vi) where vi < v
i
` does not participate. If Ci(vi)  ci, we assume
all types of bidder i participate; If Ci(vi)  ci, we assume no type of bidder
i participates. Because the measure of all involved types on the shutdown
curves is zero, this specication does not aect the participation and bidding
strategies of other types of bidders. More importantly, the expected total
surplus is not aected.
Denition 3.1. Consider any increasing and continuous function i : [vi; vi]!
[ci; ci]. Let  
i
p(i) = f(ci; vi) 2 Tijci  i(vi) and vi  v^ig where v^i = inffvi 2
[vi; vi] : i(vi) > cig, if i(vi) 6 ci; otherwise  ip(i) = ;.
Therefore, for a shutdown curve Ci(),  ip(Ci); i 2 N is the set of all
participating types of bidder i. Note that  ip(Ci) is empty if Ci(vi)  ci, and
 ip(Ci) is Ti if Ci(vi)  ci.
Lemma 3.1 has shown that any implementable entry must be characterized
by a set of continuous and increasing shutdown curves for the bidders. How-
ever, it is not true that every set of shutdown curves that are continuous and
increasing must correspond to an implementable entry. We next further char-
acterize some useful properties of implementable shutdown curves following a
mechanism design approach.
Consider any implementable entry equilibrium described by given shut-
8This specication is supported by Lemma C.1 in the Appendix that establishes the
payos of bidders whose types are on the shutdown curves if they participate.
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down curves C = (C1(); C2();    ; CN()). For the corresponding shutdown
curve Ci() of bidder i, dene mi(ti) = ti if ti 2  ip(Ci), and mi(ti) = ; if







where t i = (t1;    ; ti 1; ti+1;    ; tN), T i =
Q
j 6=i Tj, m i(t i)) denotes the
signals of bidders other than i, and f(t i) is the density function of t i. 1Minf;g
is the indicator function of the setMi nf;g inMi. Note that Ui(p; x; ti; ;) = 0.
A direct semirevelation mechanism (p; x) is a truthful one that implements
entry of given C if and only if for all i 2 N ,
Ui(p;x; ti; ti)  0; 8 ti 2  ip(Ci); (3.1)
Ui(p;x; ti; ti)  Ui(p;x; ti; t0i); 8 ti; t0i 2  ip(Ci); (3.2)
Ui(p;x; ti; ti)  Ui(p;x; ti; t0i); 8 ti 2  ip(Ci); t0i =2  ip(Ci); (3.3)
Ui(p;x; ti; t
0
i)  0; 8 ti =2  ip(Ci); t0i 2 Ti; (3.4)




pj(m)  1; 8m 2M: (3.5)
(3.4) guarantees that low-type bidders do not participate while (3.1) guar-
antees that high-type bidders do participate. (3.2) and (3.3) are IC conditions.
In the next proposition (whose proof will be given in the Appendix C), we par-
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tially characterize an implementable entry by following a mechanism design
approach. Note the monotonicity of Ci() implies that Ci() is dierentiable
almost everywhere. Nevertheless, the next proposition rst establishes the
Lipschitz continuity of Ci() without relying on its dierentiability.
Proposition 3.1. For any given implementable shutdown curves
C = (C1(); C2();    ; CN()), we have for each i 2 N , Ci satises the Lipschitz
condition jCi(vi)   Ci(v0i)j  jvi   v0ij; 8vi; v0i 2 (vi; vi). Moreover, Ci() is
dierentiable almost everywhere, and the derivative C 0i(vi) (when it exists)
gives entrant i's expected winning probability regardless of his entry costs if his
value is vi 2 (vil ; viu).
3.4 A Relaxed Problem
Note that Proposition 3.1 above does not provide a full characterization of
implementable shutdown curves. As a matter of fact, it is well expected that
to fully pin down the set of all implementable entries in our two-dimensional
setting is very challenging if not impossible. For this reason, it is not realistic to
study ex ante ecient auctions via the set of implementable shutdown curves.
On the other hand, based on Proposition 3.1, we can restrict our attention
to the increasing and continuous shutdown curves which satisfy the Lipschitz
condition when searching for the ex ante ecient entries. This observation
leads us to consider N increasing and continuous functions from [vi; vi] to
[ci; ci] satisfying the Lipschitz condition for i 2 N as a hypothetical entry. We
can thus study ex ante ecient auctions by considering a relaxed optimization
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problem.
Denition 3.2. Let 
i = f!i() : [vi; vi] ! [ci; ci] j !i() is increasing and
j!i(vi) !i(v0i)j  jvi  v0ij; 8vi; v0i 2 [vi; vi]g. Let di be the usual metric on the
space Fi of continuous functions on [vi; vi], i.e., di(!i; !0i) = maxvi2[vi;vi]fj!i(vi) 










for ! = (!1; : : : ; !N); !




Lemma 3.2. The space (
; d) is compact.
Proof: Fix any i 2 N . Any function in 
i is also bounded by ci. By the Lip-
schitz condition, 
i is an equicontinuous family of real valued functions on the
interval [vi; vi]. The classical Ascoli-Arzela Theorem as on page 208 of Royden
and Fitzpatrick (2010) implies that the closure of 
i in Fi is compact. Since
the monotonicity, continuity and Lipschitz conditions are preserved under the
uniform limit as dened by the metric di, 
i is a closed subset of Fi. Hence

i is compact. The compactness of (
; d) thus follows. 2
We consider a relaxed problem where the designer can observe all buy-
ers' types (ci; vi), and he can direct any buyer i to participate if and only if
ti 2  ip(!i) according to any N curves ! = (!i()) 2 
 and allocate the ob-
ject to any entrant (including the seller). The designer chooses the optimal
! and allocation rule to maximize the total expected surplus. Clearly, for
any ! the designer should allocate the object to the entrant with the highest
value. In other words, the above allocation rule renders the maximal expected
total surplus (METS) for any given entry corresponding to !. Denote the
METS corresponding to ! by S(!). Here, we would like to emphasize that the
participation and incentive compatibility conditions of bidders are ignored.
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Let t = (ti)
N
i=1 and vh(t;!) to denote the highest value of the seller and all
participating bidders for given !. We thus have
vh(t;!)
=
8><>: maxfv0;maxf8j;(cj ;vj)2 jp(wj)g vjg; if fj 2 Nj(cj; vj) 2  
j
p(!j)g 6= ;;
v0; if fj 2 Nj(cj; vj) 2  jp(!j)g = ;:







The following lemma shows the continuity of S() on 
.
Lemma 3.3. The maximal expected total surplus S() is continuous on 
.
It is thus obvious from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 that there exists a ! 2 
 that
maximizes S(!). In the next lemma, we characterize the properties of the
optimal !, which provide the key insights for us to solve our bi-dimensional
screening problem. The proofs for both Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 will be given in
the Appendix.
Lemma 3.4. There must exist ! = (!i ) 2 
 that maximizes S() within 
.
Bidder i with types ti 2 Ti where ti 2 (62) ip(!i ) must contribute nonnegatively
(nonpositively) to S(!) if he participates, given that any other bidder j 2
N nfig participates if and only if tj 2  jp(!j ) and the object is allocated to the
participant (including the seller) with the highest valuation.
78
3.5 Ex Ante Ecient Auction
When we characterize ! in the previous section, we ignore the full imple-
mentability of the hypothetical entries in 
. It remains a key issue whether
the optimal ! characterized in Lemma 3.4 is indeed implementable. For this
purpose, we need to show that it is implementable by an auction which allo-
cates the object to the participant with the highest valuation. The derivation
is based on the insight that the necessary conditions provided in Lemma 3.4
are sucient conditions for a second-price auction to implement !.
Theorem 3.1. The second-price auction with a reserve price equal to seller's
valuation and zero entry fee has an entry and bidding equilibrium that maxi-
mizes the expected total surplus of all seller and bidders.
Proof: Note that the contribution of type ti to S(!
) can be alternatively
interpreted as the expected payos of the bidder i of type ti in this second-
price auction, if other bidder j(6= i) participates if and only if tj 2  jp(!j ) and
bids their true values when participating. It is thus an entry equilibrium in
the second-price auction that bidder i participates if and only if ti 2  ip(!i ).
This auction induces entry ! and truthful bidding of entrants, thus it achieves
S(!). 2
The procedure of showing the ex ante ecient auction illustrates clearly
the intuition behind Theorem 3.1. A set of necessary conditions for the hypo-
thetical optimal entry ! 2 
 are sucient for it to be implemented through
a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to seller's valuation and zero
entry fee, which always awards the object to the participant with the highest
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value.
Cao et al. (2015) reveal that in general there exist multiple entry equilib-
ria in second price auctions with bi-dimensional private information of values
and entry costs. This means that the ex ante ecient auction identied in
Theorem 3.1 in general has inecient entry equilibria other than the ecient
one. Nevertheless, Cao et al. (2015) establish sucient conditions for the
uniqueness of entry equilibrium for environments with two potential bidders.
We dene ex post eciency by allocation of the object to the entrant with
the highest value. The following result entails.
Corollary 3.1. Any ex ante ecient auction must be ex post ecient, i.e., it
always allocates the object to the participant with the highest valuation regard-
less of the entry cost prole.
Proof: Denote the ecient entry implemented by an ex ante ecient auction
A by C. According to Proposition 3.1, we have C 2 
. For C, the METS is
attained if the object is assigned to the participant with the highest valuation.
This METS cannot be higher than that of the Theorem 3.1 ex ante ecient
auction by the denition of !. However, if auction A fails to allocate the
object to the bidder with the highest valuation with a positive probability,
then the total expected surplus achieved must be strictly lower than that of
the ex ante ecient auction of Theorem 3.1. However, this means that auction
A cannot be ante ecient. Therefore, any ex ante ecient auction must be
ex post ecient. 2
Corollary 3.1 implies that an ecient auction cannot favor the entrants
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with lower entry costs in terms of ex post winning chances. This is somewhat
surprising since such an allocation rule could provide higher incentive to more
cost-ecient buyers to participate, which could possibly increase the ex ante
eciency by reducing entry costs of the participants.
Moreover, Corollary 3.1 means that the ex ante eciency of the second
price auction of Theorem 3.1 in general can not be extended to a rst price or
all pay auction when bidders are asymmetric since in these auctions ex post
eciency is not guaranteed.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter studies ex ante ecient auctions in a setting where bidders have
bi-dimensional private information on values and entry costs. By resolving
several diculties due to the nature of the bi-dimensional screening problem,
we nd that a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to the seller's
valuation is ex ante ecient, and any ex ante ecient auction must be ex post
ecient. The crucial point in our approach is to extend the unknown feasible
domain of social planners problem to a suitable domain so that the maximal
expected total surplus function has the same maximum in both domains.
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Proofs of Chapter One
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1.2 and Proof of Theo-
rem 1.1
Proof of Lemma 1.2
Proof. We consider the prize structures covered by V0 and V1. We solve the
subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction. Recall that the ordered
pair (nA; nB) denotes the number of battles won by the ordered pair of players
(A;B).
We rst look at the third battle. When (nA; nB) = (2; 0), by budget con-
straint (1:1), the two players have a common eective prize spread of winning
the third battle:
vA(2; 0) = vB(2; 0) = v(3)  v(2) = v(1)  v(0)  0.
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By Lemma 1(i), we have the following equilibrium eort supply







Each player's winning probability for this battle is




The same results hold when (nA; nB) = (0; 2).
When (nA; nB) = (1; 1), the two players' common eective prize spread of
winning the third battle is
vA(1; 1) = vB(1; 1) = v(2)  v(1)  0:
By Lemma 1(i), we have the following equilibrium eort supply







Each player's winning probability for this battle is




We now turn to the second battle. When (nA; nB) = (1; 0), the eective
prize spread for player A is
vA(1; 0) = [pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  xA(2; 0)]
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Analogously, the eective prize spread for player B is

















The prize structures are restricted to V0 [ V1. Therefore Lemma 1.1(i)


















The players' winning probabilities are
pA(1; 0) =
xrA(1; 0)






















Similarly, when (nA; nB) = (0; 1), we have



















Then players' winning probabilities are
pA(0; 1) = pB(1; 0) =
vrB(1; 0)




pB(0; 1) = pA(1; 0) =
vrA(1; 0)





Now we consider the rst battle. By (a) to (h), the eective prize spreads
are symmetric across the two players:
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0)
= A(1; 0)[pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  xA(2; 0)]
+ pB(1; 0)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  xA(1; 1)]  xA(1; 0)
  pA(0; 1)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  xA(1; 1)]









[vB(1; 0)  vA(1; 0)]
+
vrA(1; 0)




Applying Lemma 1.1(i), we have the following equilibrium eort





and players' winning probabilities are




By (a) to (h), together with the calculation above, the aggregate eort over
all three battles equals
TE1 = 2xA(0; 0) + [xA(1; 0) + xB(1; 0)] + pA(1; 0)[xA(2; 0) + xB(2; 0)]

























which gives the desired result by incorporating the budget constraints.
Proof of Theorem 1.1
Step 1
Proof. We discuss two cases to show the optimal prize structure must be in
V0[V1. In Case 1, r 2 (0; r]; in Case 2, r 2 (r; 2], where r  1:19 is the unique









)r on [0; 2].
Clearly, a solution r exists and must fall in (1; 2). Note that the left side
of the equation increases with r and the right side decreases with r when
r 2 (1; 2). This observation has two implications on r. First, r is unique.









> (r   1) 1r if and only if r < r.









jr=1:2 < (r   1) 1r jr=1:2. Therefore,
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we have r 2 (1; 1:2). More specically, one can obtain the numerical solution
of r  1:1935. This property will be employed when we prove Properties
A.1-A.3.
In Case 1, we show that V2 [ V3 = ; in Lemma A.1 as follow. As for Case
2, we show that the eort-maximizing prize structure must be within V1 by
proving the following Lemma A.2 and A.3 and Propositions A.1-A.3.
Lemma A.1. (i) For any r 2 (0; r], we have V0 6= ;, V1 6= ;, and V2 = V3 =
;. Thus V = V0 [ V1;
(ii) For any r 2 (r; 2], we have Vi 6= ;; 8i.
Proof. It is clear that V0 6= ; and V1 6= ; in both cases, since wA = wB




; 1). For the rst part, by Denition
1.3, it suces to show that wA and wB satisfy either r  1 + (wAwB )r when
wA  wB or r  1 + (wBwA )r when wA  wB for any given r 2 (0; r]. By























)r when wA  wB for any r > 0. By the









)r  1 + (wA
wB




)r  1 + (wB
wA
)r, 8r 2 (0; r].
For the second part, we can verify that the feasible prize structure
(v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)) = (0; 0; 1; 1) belongs to V2, 8r 2 (r; 2]. To show this,






















)r < r holds when r 2 (r; 2], which follows from the denition
of r. Therefore V2 6= ;. In addition, note that the feasible prize structure



















) and 1 + (wA
wB











holds when r 2 (r; 2]. Hence V3 6= ;.
In Case 2 where r 2 (r; 2], V2[V3 are no longer empty, we have to compare
the optimal prize structures across Vi. Note that, for any prize structure in V2[
V3, players' equilibrium eort in the second battle of the contest is calculated
by using Lemma 1.1(ii), instead of using Lemma 1.1(i) as we calculate TE1.
We continue to prove our argument for Case 2. We rst show that any
prize structure in V0nV1 is not optimal in Lemma A.2. Second, we calculate
the expected aggregate eort TE2 and TE3, for the prize structures in V2
and V3 respectively, and we nd supV2 TE2, supV3 TE3. We present the re-
sults in Proposition A.1 and Proposition A.2. Third, we show that supV2 TE2,
supV3 TE3 are two lower bounds for maxV1 TE1 in Lemma A.3. Combining the
results, we conclude that maxV1 TE1  maxfsupV2TE2, supV3TE3g in Propo-
sition A.3. We then only need to restrict our search within V1 to determine
the optimal prize structure when r 2 (r; 2].
Lemma A.2. 8r 2 (r; 2], any prize structure in V0nV1 is strictly dominated
by a prize structure in V0 \ V1.
Proof. For any prize prole in V0 or V1, the resulting aggregate eort is denoted
by TE1 in (1:4). Take any prize prole in V0nV1. We construct a prize structure
in V0 \ V1 that induces a strictly higher level of eort than the given prize
structure in V0nV1.




































for prize structures in V0 [ V1 when r 2 (r; 2].
Recall that any prize structure fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g 2 V0nV1 satises











; v(3)g 2 V0 \ V1. We shall show the aggregate eort
induced by the new prize structure fev(0); ev(1); ev(2); ev(3)g is higher than the
aggregate eort induced by the given prize structure fv(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)g.
And it is sucient to prove that d
dv(2)
TE1 > 0 when wB > wA and r 2 (r; 2].




































































































































) ( 1) + (1  r
2
4







Note that [(1 + r
2
4
)  ( 1) + (1   r2
4
)  2] = 1   3
4
r2 < 0 when r 2 (r; 2].


























TE1 > 0 when wB > wA and r 2 (r; 2]. We thus have that
any structure in V0nV1 with v(2) 2 [12 ; 2 v(0)3 ) is dominated by





Since Lemma A.2 establishes that any prize structure inside V0 is domi-
nated by a prize structure in V1, we can ignore all prize structures in V0nV1 to
identify the optimal prize structure. Note that any prize structure within V1
satises wA  wB, i.e., the winner of the rst battle has a higher prize spread.
We next pin down the expected aggregate eort induced by prize proles
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in V2 and V3, respectively. For any given prize structure, computing aggregate
eort requires solving the players' choice of eort on each stage game for every
possible path. For any prize structure in V2 [ V3, players' equilibrium eort
in the second battle of the contest is calculated by using Lemma 1.1(ii). The
uniqueness of subgame perfect equilibrium is discussed after Lemma 1.1.
In the next two propositions, we show that we can ignore the prize proles
in V2 and V3 when searching for the optimal prize structure. As mentioned, the
idea is to show that the highest possible expected aggregate eort generated
by prizes in either V2 or V3 is dominated by at least one of the two bounds in
Lemma A.3.




































, which is lower than
maxV1 TE1. Moreover, there exists no prize structure in V2 that can induce
supTE2.
Proof. We solve the aggregate eort TE2 and then maximize TE2 within V2.
We note that TE2 decreases in v(2) and v(2) >
r[1+(r 1) 1r ]






By calculations, the proposition follows.
We rst solve the game by backward induction and calculate players' ex-
pected aggregate eort. Recall (nA; nB) denotes the history of the game. We
start from the third battle, which can be solved in the same way as Lemma
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1:2.
When (nA; nB) = (2; 0) or (0; 2)







The winning probabilities are




When (nA; nB) = (1; 1); we have







The winning probabilities are




Next, we look at the second battle. When (nA; nB) = (1; 0), recall from




(1  v(1)  v(0)) + r
4




(1  v(1)  v(0)) + r
4
( 1 + 3v(1)  v(0)) = wB:
vA(1; 0)  vB(1; 0) is equivalent to wA  wB. As the prize proles are in
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V2, applying Lemma 1:1(ii) gives the equilibrium eort:


















0; with probability 1  q:
The winning probabilities are
pA(1; 0) = 1  (1  1
r
)q; pB(1; 0) = (1  1
r
)q.
Similarly, when (nA; nB) = (0; 1), we have












0; with probability 1  q:







The winning probabilities are
pA(0; 1) = (1  1
r



















Now we come to the rst battle. The common prize spread is
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0)
= fpA(1; 0)[pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  xA(2; 0)]
+ pB(1; 0)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  xA(1; 1)]  xA(1; 0)g
  fpA(0; 1)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  xA(1; 1)]
+ pB(0; 1)[pA(0; 2)v(1) + pB(0; 2)v(0)  xA(0; 2)]  E[fxA(0; 1)]g
= [1  (1  1
r
)q][v(2)  v(0)] + (1  1
r




Thus the eort supply is




and winning probabilities are




Aggregating over the three battle, we have the aggregate eort:
TE2 = 2xA(0; 0) + xA(1; 0) + E[fxB(1; 0)]

























Given that, we now maximize eort TE2 subject to prize proles are in
V2. By denition of V2, wA  wB and 1 + (wBwA )r < r  2 can be simplied as





(r   1) 1r   1
4








r (r   1) 1r
3
4















r)(r   1) 1r + 3
2
r   1] v(0) +
r[1 + (r   1) 1r ]
[(1 + 3
2
r)(r   1) 1r + 3
2
r   1] :
Clearly, TE2 is decreasing in v(2) and v(0) when r 2 (r; 2]. However optimal
v(0) = 0 does not follow immediately. This is because we have to take care of
the role of v(0) in the lower bound of v(2) above. After the calculations, we can
show for any prize prole in V2, the eort induced is lower than TE2(v(0) =








), which is the following. The full arguments and
calculation are in the Appendix A.4.
TE2(v(0) = 0; v(2) =
r[1 + (r   1) 1r ]









(r   1)(2  r)





Analogous to Proposition A.1, we provide the aggregate eort induced by
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prize structures in V3, and establish an upper bound that is not attainable in
V3.











































, which is lower than
maxV1 TE1. Moreover, there exists no prize structure in V3 that can induce
supTE3.
Proof. As before, we calculate the aggregate eort TE3 and maximize TE3
within V3.
The third battle can be analyzed identically as in Proposition A.1. We now
look at the second battle. Recall (nA; nB) denotes the history of the contest.




(1  v(1)  v(0)) + r
4




(1  v(1)  v(0)) + r
4
( 1 + 3v(1)  v(0)) = wB:
vA(1; 0)  vB(1; 0) is equivalent to wA  wB. As the prize proles are in












0; with probability 1  q:
107







The winning probability are
pA(1; 0) = (1  1
r
)q; pB(1; 0) = 1  (1  1
r
)q:
(nA; nB) = (0; 1) is dual case of (nA; nB) = (1; 0).
Now we come to the rst battle where (nA; nB) = (0; 0). We pin down the
common eective prize spread:
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0) = (1  1
r







Thus we have the eort supply




and the winning probabilities




Aggregate eort thus equals
TE3 = 2xA(0; 0) + E[fxA(1; 0)] + xB(1; 0)

























Within V3, v(2) < r(1+(r 1)
1
r )



















v(0) when r 2















< 0 . In addition,
TE3 is decreasing in v(0) and increasing in v(2) when r 2 (r; 2]. We thus
have for any prize prole in V3, the resulting aggregate eort is lower than
TE3(v(0) = 0; v(2) =
r(1+(r 1) 1r )





), which is the following.
TE3(v(0) = 0; v(2) =
r(1 + (r   1) 1r )
(r   1) 1r (3r
2



















  1)(r   1) 1r ] :
We leave the full calculation details in Appendix A.4.
We successively show that the highest possible expected aggregate eort
generated by prize structures in either V2 or V3 is dominated by at least one
of these two bounds. This fact enables us to ignore V2 and V3 when we search
for the optimum.






























) 2 V0. The two resulting aggregate
eort levels generated by the two prize structures provide two lower bounds
for the maximal eort inducible in V1. The remaining substitutions and cal-
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culations are included in the online appendix.
Proposition A.3. 8r 2 (r; 2], the optimal prize structure cannot be in VnV1
and must be in V1 if it exists.
Proof. According to Lemma A.3, Propositions A.1 and A.2, we have
maxV1 TE1  maxfsupV2TE2, supV3TE3g. Together with Lemma A.2, Propo-
sition A.3 follows.
Step 2
Proof. It suces to show that v(3) = 1 under a release restriction of v(0) +
v(3)  1, assuming that v(0) = 0, since only prize spread will aect a player'
incentive. For any prize structure (v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)) with v(0) = 0 and




; 1) such that the
dierence v(1)   v(0), v(2)   v(1), v(3)   v(2) increase proportionally by a
factor of 1
v(3)
(> 1), and therefore both players would exert larger eort at all
reachable states (nA; nB) by a factor of
1
v(3)
, and each player wins with the same
winning probability at each reachable state (nA; nB) as before. As a result,




; 1) induces larger expected aggregate eort
than the given prize structure (v(0); v(1); v(2); v(3)).
Now, we dierentiate TE1(v(0);v(2))
r



















































































































wB > wA. wA and wB are non-negative because of the monotonicity of prizes.







)v(1) + (1   r2
4














































jv(0)=0] > 0 when v(2) 2 [0; 23). As a result,
TE1(v(0); v(2))jv(0)=0 < TE1(v(0); v(2))jv(0)=0;v(2)= 2
3









jv(0)=0] for the remaining case where
wB  wA, i.e. v(2) 2 [23 ; 1] to pin down the optimal v(2). Recall   wBwA can be






















(wA + wB)]. Recall v(1)   v(0) = wA+wB2   wA wBr































) + (1+ r
2






























































































jv(0)=0] sign= D((v(0) = 0; v(2); r); r) whenever




















)(2v(2) 1) > 0 holds whenever v(2) < 1.
Step 3
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of r is revealed by the following Property
A.1. Proofs for Properties A.1-A.3 are relegated to Appendix A.4.








strictly decreases with r 2 (0; r] and has a
unique root of r  1: 088 4 in this range.









and (r   1) 1r that is established in
the discussion following Denition 1.4, 
r
in the following Property A.2 is well
dened.
Property A.2. D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r strictly increases with r 2 (r; 2] and has a
unique root of r  1:31 in this range.
Property A.3. D(; r) strictly increases with  when   
r
























; if r 2 (0; r];




provides an applicable lower bound for the prize-spread ratio (i.e. the
lower bound of ) in battle 2 for r 2 (0; 2].
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1.2
Proof. In Lemmas A.4 and A.5, we will provide the expected aggregate eort
under the prize structures in V4 and V5 and characterize the optimal prizes in
V4 and V5, respectively. Combining both lemmas, we can identify the optimal
prize structures for each r > 2. For a given prize structure, computing players'
aggregate eort requires solving the players' choice of eort on each stage game
for every possible path. Since Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries (1996) verify the existence of a unique mixed equilibrium de-
scribed by Lemma 1.1(iii) in a one-shot all-pay contest, the corresponding
equilibrium is unique for each stage game, and the usual backwards induction
argument shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole contest is
unique.
Lemma A.4. When r > 2, the expected aggregate eort equals TE4 = 1 2v(0)
for all prize proles in V4 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : v(2)   v(1)  v(1)   v(0)g.
The maximum aggregate eort in V4 equals 1, which is achieved by any prize
1Note that (0; r]  (0; 1:2].
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structure (0; 1  v(2); v(2); 1), 8v(2) 2 [2
3
; 1].
Proof. Note that when r > 2, Lemma 1.1(iii) applies. As usual, we solve the
game by backward induction.
First, consider battle 3. Given history (nA; nB) = (2; 0), the common
eective prize spread is:
vA(2; 0) = v(3)  v(2)  0:
vB(2; 0) = v(1)  v(0)  0:
By (1.1), we have vA(2; 0) = vB(2; 0) = v(1)  v(0).
Thus expected eort supply is given by
E[fxA(2; 0)] = E[fxB(2; 0)] = v(1)  v(0)
2
:
The winning probabilities are




History (0; 2) is symmetric. The eective prize spread is
vA(0; 2) = vB(0; 2) = v(1)  v(0)  0:
Their eort supply equals




The winning probabilities are




When (nA; nB) = (1; 1), the common eective prize spread is
vA(1; 1) = vB(1; 1) = v(2)  v(1)  0:
Therefore, their expected eort supply equals








We now consider the second battle. When (nA; nB) = (1; 0), the eective
prize spreads are as follows. For player 1,
fvA(1; 0) = [pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  EfxA(2; 0)]
  [pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  EfxA(1; 1)]
= v(2)  v(1):
Similarly,
fvB(1; 0) = v(1)  v(0):
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We have fvA(1; 0)  fvB(1; 0) if and only if v(2)   v(1)  v(1)   v(0), which is
the case considered in this lemma, i.e., prize proles in V4.
The winning probabilities are
pA(1; 0) = 1  1
2




where q = v(1) v(0)
v(2) v(1) .
Players' expected eort is
E[fxA(1; 0)] = 1
2




History (0; 1) is a dual case of history (1; 0). We have eort supply




E[fxB(0; 1)] = E[fxA(1; 0)] = 1
2
(v(1)  v(0)).




q; pB(0; 1) = 1  1
2
q:
Now we come to the rst battle. The common eective prize spread is
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0)
= fpA(1; 0)[pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  E[fxA(2; 0)]]
+ pB(1; 0)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  E[fxA(1; 1)]]  E[fxA(1; 0])g
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  fpA(0; 1)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  E[fxA(1; 1)]
+ pB(0; 1)[pA(0; 2)v(1) + pB(0; 2)v(0)  E[fxA(0; 2)]  xA(0; 1)g
= (1  1
2






Therefore, their expected eort supply equals
E[fxA(0; 0)] = E[fxB(0; 0)] = vA(0; 0)
2
:
and the winning probabilities are




Total eort, therefore, is as follows:
TE4 = 2E[fxA(0; 0)] + E[fxA(1; 0)] + E[fxB(1; 0)]
+ pA(1; 0)(E[fxA(2; 0)] + E[fxA(2; 0)])
+ pB(1; 0)(E[fxA(1; 1)] + E[fxA(1; 1)])
= vA(0; 0) +
1
2
(1 + q)(v(1)  v(0))
+ (1  q
2
)(v(1)  v(0)) + q
2
(v(2)  v(1))
= 2(v(1)  v(0)) + (v(2)  v(1))
= v(2) + v(1)  2v(0)
= 1  2v(0):
Maximizing the total eort TE4 among prize structures in V4 yields the
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optimal allocations v(0) = 0, v(2) 2 [2
3
; 1], v(1) = 1   v(2), and v(3) = 1. As
a result, TE4 = 1, i.e., the rent is fully dissipated.
Lemma A.5. When r > 2; the expected aggregate eort is TE5 = 3(v(2)  
v(1)) for all prize structures in V5 = V \ f(v(0); v(2)) : v(2)   v(1)  v(1)  
v(0)g. The maximum aggregate eort in V5 equals 1, which is achieved by the





Proof. We use backward induction to solve the game. Note Lemma 1.1(iii)
applies to all three battles. The third-battle results for history (2; 0), (1; 1)
and (0; 2) remain same as in the proof of Lemma A.4. Next, we look at the
second battle. The expressions for the prize spreads remain same as in the
proof of Lemma A.4.
History (1; 0): fvA(1; 0)  fvB(1; 0) if and only if v(2)  v(1)  v(1)  v(0),
and we are considering V5.
Since their levels of eort follow
fxA(1; 0) = ; fxB(1; 0) =
8><>: 
; with probability q = v(2) v(1)
v(1) v(0) ;
0; with probability 1  q;
over [0; v(2)  v(1)].
Their expected eort equals
E[fxA(1; 0)] = E[] = 1
2
(v(2)  v(1)),









q; pB(1; 0) = 1  q
2
,
where q = v(2) v(1)
v(1) v(0) .
History (0; 1) is the dual case of history (1; 0).
Now we come to the rst battle. We rst pin down the common eective
prize spread as follows:
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0) =
1
2





Thus their expected eort supply equals
E[fxA(0; 0)] = E[fxB(1; 0)] = vA(0; 0)
2
.
The winning probabilities are




Total eort thus is as follow:
TE5 = 2E[fxA(0; 0)] + E[fxA(1; 0)] + E[fxB(1; 0)]
+ pA(1; 0)(E[fxA(2; 0)] + E[fxA(2; 0)])
+ pB(1; 0)(E[fxA(1; 1)] + E[fxA(1; 1)])











Therefore, the designer's problem is
max TE5
s:t: (v(1)  v(0))  (v(2)  v(1));
0  v(0)  1
2
 v(2)  1;
v(2) + v(0)  1;
which yields the optimal structure v(0) = 0, v(1) = 1
3
, v(2) = 2
3
and v(3) = 1,
and the optimal total expected eort TE5 = 1.
Note that V = V4 [ V5 when r > 2. Combining both lemmas immediately
yields the following theorem, which fully characterizes the optimal prize prole
when r > 2.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1.4
Proof. We calculate the expected aggregate eort levels in lemmas A.6 and
A.7.
Lemma A.6. When r  2, the expected total eort is TE1T = 3r4 (v(2)  v(0))
in the team contest.
Proof. Note that Lemma 1.1(i) applies to all three battles when r  2. Before
a battle is fought, the history of past battles, or the state of the contest, is
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observed by players involved. The history of the contest is denoted (nA; nB)
where nA is the number of wins secured by team i = A;B: We solve the game
by backward induction. We rst look at the third battle.
History (2; 0): the eective prize spreads are
vA(2; 0) = v(3)  v(2)  0; vB(2; 0) = v(1)  v(0)  0:
The budget constraint v(3) + v(0) = v(2) + v(1) implies v(3)   v(2) =
v(1)  v(0), so vA(2; 0) = vB(2; 0)

























The winning probabilities are
pA(2; 0) =
xrA(2; 0)






; pB(2; 0) =
xrB(2; 0)






History (0; 2) is similar. We now look at history (1; 1). For history (1; 1),
the common prize spread is
vA(1; 1) = vB(1; 1) = v(2)  v(1):
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Thus eort supply is




The winning probabilities are




We now look at the second battle. The history can be (1; 0) or (0; 1).
History (1; 0): we rst pin down the eective prize spreads:




(v(3)  v(1)) = 1
2
(v(2)  v(0));





Thus eort supply is







The winning probabilities are




History (0; 1): This is dual case of history (1; 0).
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Now we come to the rst battle. We pin down the common eective prize
spread:
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0)
= fpA(1; 0)[pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)]
+ pB(1; 0)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)]g
  fpA(0; 1)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)]





Thus eort supply is







The winning probabilities are




Thus, total eort can be calculated as follow:
TE1T = 2xA(0; 0) + [xA(1; 0) + xB(1; 0)]
+pA(1; 0)[xA(2; 0) + xB(2; 0)] + pB(1; 0)[xA(1; 1) + xB(1; 1)]










in the team contest.
Proof. Note Lemma 1.1(iii) applies to each battle. Moreover, Fu, Lu and Pan
(2015) reveals that the prize spread is common for the two players in each
battle. We solve the game by backward induction. We rst look at the third
battle.
History (2; 0): For history (2; 0), we rst describe the two players' eective
prize spreads:
vA(2; 0) = v(3)  v(2)  0; vB(2; 0) = v(1)  v(0)  0:
We have vA(2; 0) = vB(2; 0) follows from the budget constraints (1).
Thus player's expected eort supply is given by
E[fxA(2; 0)] = E[fxB(2; 0)] = v(1)  v(0)
2
:
The winning probabilities are




Analogously, we analyze the history where (0; 2) and (1; 1).
Respectively, their eort supply follows




E[fxA(1; 1)] = E[fxB(1; 1)] = v(2)  v(1)
2
:
History (1; 0): we rst pin down the common eective prize spread:




Their expected eort supply equals
E[fxA(1; 0)] = E[fxB(1; 0)] = v(2)  v(0)
2
:
The winning probabilities are




History (0; 1) is dual case of history (1; 0).
After we solve the rst battle where history is (0; 0), their expected eort
supply equals
E[fxA(0; 0)] = E[fxB(0; 0)] = v(2)  v(0)
2
:
By symmetry, aggregate eort thus is as follow:






A.4 Proof of Properies and Proof for Lemma
A.3
This appendix provides the proofs for Properties A.1-A.3 and Lemma A.3, and
presents omitted details in the proofs of Propositions A.1 and A.2.





























> 0, r2   4 < 0, and ln    r 2
r+2














r2   4 [8r + 30r
3 + 32r( r   2
r + 2
)r + ( 48  8r2 + 5r4) ln( r   2
r + 2
)















r   11r2+8 decreases with r over (0; r].
Next, we show Property A.1 by discussing two cases where r 2 (0; 1] and
r 2 [1; r]:
When r 2 (0; 1], (4  2 r
2+r
2r














r   11r2 + 8 > 0 over (0; 1]. And
2 r
2+r








strictly decreases with r.
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5r2   12r + 4 jr=r
< 0:
This is because r 2 (1; 1:2), which is shown in the proof for step 1 of Theorem




































< 0, we have r < r.







  1) + (3r
2
+ 1)(r   1) 1r ][(1  r
2
)( r   1
+ (r   1)(r   1)) + (1 + r
2
)( r + 1 + (r + 1)(r   1))(r   1) 1r ]
+ 2(r   1) 1r r( 3r
2
4












r   1)(r   (r   1)2 + 1) + (1
2





r   1)r(3  r) + (1
2




r   1)(3  r) + (1
2
r + 1)(r   1)1+ 1r ]:






  1) + (3r
2
+ 1)(r   1) 1r ][(1
2




r + 1) (r   1)1+ 1r ]r + 2(r   1) 1r r( 3r
2
4




  1) + (3r
2
+ 1)(r   1) 1r ][(1
2















r   1)(3  r) + (1
2
r + 1) (r   1)1+ 1r ]









r + 1) (r   1)1+ 1r ] + 2r(r   1) 1r (3
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r + 1) (r   1)2+ 1r :
We dierentiate D(; r)j





























r + 1)(r   1) 1r+2

















r + 1)(r   1) 1r+2
+ 2r[(1 + r)(r   1) 1r   1
r
(ln(r   1))(r   1) 1r+1]
= (1  1
2










r + 1)(1 + 2r)(r   1) 1r+1
+ 2r(1 + r)(r   1) 1r + [9
4









(ln(r   1))(r   1) 1r+2]
+ 2[ (ln(r   1))(r   1) 1r+1]
=  3r3 + 51
4
r2   14r + 3 + 1
4









(ln(r   1))(r   1) 1r+2]
+ 2[ (ln(r   1))(r   1) 1r+1]
>  3r3 + 51
4
r2   14r + 3 + 1
4





r2   14r + 3) =  9r2 + 51
2
r   14 > 0 over [r; 2],  3r3 +
51
4
r2  14r+3 increases with r over [r; 2]. And 1
4
r (15r3 + 11r2 + 2r   12) and















r + 1)(r   1)2+ 1r ]
  3r3 + 51
4
r2   14r + 3 + 1
4
r(15r3 + 11r2 + 2r   12)(r   1) 1r jr=r
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> 0
We thus conclude that D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r strictly increases with r 2 (r; 2] and
has a unique root of r  1: 31 in this range. In particular, sinceD(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r
strictly increases with r 2 (r; 2], D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r ;r=r < 0 and
D(; r)j
=(r 1) 1r ;r=r = 0, we have r < r
.
Proof of Property A.3




for each r 2






























)(r   1)rr 1 + (1 + r
2
)( r + 1 + (r + 1)2r)]








)( r   1 + (r   1)(r + 1)r)
+ (1  r
2






)(r   1)rr 1 + (1 + r
2
)( r + 1 + (r + 1)2r)]




= [ 4r2 + 3
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r4 when r 2 [0; 1:2]. With some calculation, we know
that there exists an r0 around 1 such that 
0(r) > 0 when r 2 [0; r0), and
 0(r) < 0 when r 2 (r0; 1:2]. Thus (r) achieves its minimum at the boundary
when r 2 [0; 1:2]. Both (r)jr=0 > 0 and (r)jr=1:2 > 0. Hence, (r) > 0 holds





r 2 (0; 1:2]. Note that (0; r]  (0; 1:2]. In particular, when r 2 (r; 1:2], D(; r)





We now continue to prove that D(; r) is increasing in  when   (r 1) 1r
for each r 2 [1:2; 2]. Note that we r 2 [1:2; 2]  [r; 2]. Thus, by the denition








































)(r   1)rr 1 + (1 + r
2
)( r + 1 + (r + 1)2r)]








)( r   1 + (r   1)(r + 1)r)
+ (1  r
2






)(r   1)rr 1 + (1 + r
2
)( r + 1 + (r + 1)2r)]




= [ 4r2 + 3
2



































































12r4   21r3   159r2 + 124r + 44
> 0:
The reason why last inequality holds is that (r) := 12r4 21r3 159r2+124r+
44 < 0 when r 2 [1:2; 2] since its derivative 0(r) = 48r3 63r2 318r+124 < 0
and (r)jr=1:2   47: 565 < 0 when r 2 [1:2; 2].
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For the second part, alternatively, we could show that D(; r) is an increas-




; 1] for each r 2 (r; 2].










































r4) > 0 when r 2 (r; 2] and
 2 [(r   1) 1r ; 1].
To summarize the results, we dene 
r




; (r   1) 1r g, we thus
conclude that D(; r) is increasing in  when   
r
for each r 2 (0; 2].
Proof of Lemma A.3
Proof. In V1, we have wA  wB and r  1 + (wBwA )r, which imply that v(1) 
1+v(0)
3































v(0) and  := wB
wA
2
[(r   1) 1r ; 1].








)(r 1) 1r > 0 because of the denition








)(r  1) 1r > 0. One can easily verify that prize



















, and  = (r   1) 1r belongs to
V1.

























































































































































































] and A  B = 1
(vr+1)2
[(2 + r2)vr + 2]   1. When
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, the total eort induced is given by
the following:























































































)(r   1) 1r ]
=
Ar(r   1) 1r
 1 + 3r
2
+ (1 + 3r
2




+ (1 + 3r
2





+ (1 + 3r
2







+ (1 + 3r
2

















(r   1)(2  r)
 1 + 3r
2
+ (1 + 3r
2
)(r   1) 1r :











and  = 1
(r 1) 1r
belongs to V0. The total eort induced is
TE1(v(0) = 0; v(1) =
( r
2













r(1 + (r   1) 1r )
(3r
2




















  1)(r   1) 1r + 3r
2
+ 1





  1)(r   1) 1r + 3r
2
+ 1






















)(r   1) 1r
(3r
2

















) is on the





on the boundary separating V0 and V3.
More Details for Proof of Proposition A.1
Proof. Aggregating over the three battle, we have the aggregate eort:
TE2 = 2xA(0; 0) + xA(1; 0) + E[fxB(1; 0)]
























Given that, we now maximize eort TE2 subject to prize proles are in V2.
By denition of V2, wA  wB and 1 + (wBwA )r < r  2 which can be written as
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(r   1) 1r   1
4








r (r   1) 1r
3
4















r)(r   1) 1r + 3
2
r   1] v(0) +
r[1 + (r   1) 1r ]
[(1 + 3
2




Note that TE2 is decreasing in v(2) when r 2 (r; 2]. We thus have for any prize
prole (v(0); v(2)) in V2, the eort induced is lower than TE2(v(0); v(2) = gv(2))
given by the following, where gv(2) is a function of v(0).

































































r)(r   1) 1r + 3
2
r   1] v(0) +
r[1 + (r   1) 1r ]
[(1 + 3
2
r)(r   1) 1r + 3
2
r   1] ]g:



























r)(r   1) 1r + 3
2






r)(r   1) 1r  
(1 + 1
2







, which is less than 1 when r > r. We thus have for any
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), which is the following.
TE2(v(0) = 0; v(2) =
r[1 + (r   1) 1r ]






















r[1 + (r   1) 1r ]






























r(1 + (r   1) 1r ) + 1
2






















(r   1)(2  r)





More Details for Proof of Proposition A.2
Proof. The third battle can be analyzed identically as in Proposition A.1. We
now look at the second battle. Recall (nA; nB) denotes the history of the




(1  v(1)  v(0)) + r
4





(1  v(1)  v(0)) + r
4
( 1 + 3v(1)  v(0))
= wB:
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vA(1; 0)  vB(1; 0) is equivalent to wA  wB. As the prize proles are in V3,












0;with probability 1  q:






The winning probability are
pA(1; 0) = (1  1
r
)q; pB(1; 0) = 1  (1  1
r
)q:
Similarly, when (nA; nB) = (0; 1), we have


















0;with probability 1  q:
The winning probability are
pA(0; 1) = 1  (1  1
r




E[fxB(0; 1)] = EfxA(1; 0) = q(1  1
r











Now we come to the rst battle. We pin down the common eective prize
spread:
vA(0; 0) = vB(0; 0)
= fpA(1; 0)[pA(2; 0)v(3) + pB(2; 0)v(2)  xA(2; 0)]
+ pB(1; 0)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  xA(1; 1)]  E[fxA(1; 0])g
  fpA(0; 1)[pA(1; 1)v(2) + pB(1; 1)v(1)  xA(1; 1)]
+ pB(0; 1)[pA(0; 2)v(1) + pB(0; 2)v(0)  xA(0; 2)] fxA(0; 1)g
= (1  1
r







Thus we have the eort supply




and the winning probabilities




Total eort thus is as follow:
TE3 = 2xA(0; 0) + E[fxA(1; 0)] + fxB(1; 0)






















































































































Hence, TE3 is increasing in v(2) and decreasing in v(0).
We want to maximize eort TE3 subject to prize proles are in V3, i.e.
wA  wB and 1 + (wAwB )r < r  2, as well as the non-negativity and mono-
tonicity of the prizes. Since r 2 (r; 2], constraints wA  wB and 1 + (wAwB )r <
r  2 can be written as (r   1) 1rwB > wA; i.e. v(2) < r(1+(r 1)
1
r )



















v(0). Clearly, TE3 is decreasing in v(0) and increasing in
v(2) when r 2 (r; 2]. We thus can set v(0) = 0 and consider simplied con-
straint v(2) < r(1+(r 1)
1
r )





, which is less than 1 when r > r. We thus
have for any prize prole in V3, the eort induced is converging to but smaller
than TE3(v(0) = 0; v(2) =
r(1+(r 1) 1r )





), which is the following.
TE3(v(0) = 0; v(2) =
r(1 + (r   1) 1r )
(r   1) 1r (3r
2





r(1 + (r   1) 1r )
(r   1) 1r (3r
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r(1 + (r   1) 1r )
(r   1) 1r (3r
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r   1) + 3
2
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2
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter Two
B.1 Proofs for rst-price auction environments
Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. Recall that prior belief about number of entrants
0(N) =
P
8A22M ;jAj=N 0(A), 8N 2 
. By Assumption 2.2, we have 0(A) =
0(N)
CNM
for all A such that jAj = N . Clearly, (0js; i) = 0. We now identify
(N js; i); 8N 2 f1; :::;Mg under Assumption 2.2.



























































N 0=1 (sjN 0)0(N 0)N 0
:
Recall that s(N) = (N js) = (sjN)0(N)MP
N0=0
(sjN 0)0(N 0)
. We thus have
(N js; i) = (sjN)0(N)NPM







Note that (N js; i) is independent of i and (0js; i) = 0. From now on, we
write (N js; e) := (N js; i) = Ns(N)MP
N0=1
N 0s(N 0)
; 8N  0.
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. Given participant i0s posterior belief about the number of participants
e(js) and his value x 2 [0; x], he maximizes his expected utility by choosing


















At a Nash equilibrium:
dU(b)
db
































Solving this linear dierential equation for EU(x), we have






where K is a constant, which can be identied from boundary condition































Thus, the bidding function B(x; e(js)) of an entrant with belief e(js)






















In particular, at x = 0, we know that B(0; e(js)) = 0, which also satises
the above equation because of L'Ho^pital's rule.
Proof of Lemma 2.3
Proof. Given participant i0s posterior belief about the number of participants













































Solving this linear dierential equation for EU(x):






where K is a constant that can be indentied by boundary condition




























































Proof of Lemma 2.4
Proof. In our model, the state is denoted by N , the number of actual par-
ticipants. Recall that s(N) =
(sjN)0(N)P
N0
(sjN 0)0(N 0) is the posterior belief when a
receiver observes the public signal realization s. Conditional on N and s, the
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seller's expected revenue is





where B(x; e(js)) is the bidders' bidding strategy that satises (2.2) (or
(2.3)).
Let  denote the distribution of posteriors . Combining the above results,








The usual constraint, as specied in the above problem, applies as in Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011).
Let R() = E[ eR(e(j); N)], i.e.,









Proof of Theorem 2.1











(N   1)etFN 2(t)f(t)dt]; (B.7)
where  = ((1); (2); :::; (M)) is of M dimension as
MP
j=1
(j) = 1  (0).
Taking the second order derivative wrt. (i) and (j) on both sides for






N(N)FN 1(x)eB(x;e(j))] = 0: (B.8)
























































To conduct the concavication procedure, we check the Hessian matrix H of


















































































































































Since FN 1(x)f(x)  0 and N(N)  0, we conclude:
If  > 0 (risk-averse bidders), H is negative semi-denite and R() is
(weakly) concave, and therefore no disclosure is optimal.
If  < 0 (risk-loving bidders), H is positive semi-denite and R() is
(weakly) convex, and therefore full disclosure is optimal.










Taking the second order derivative wrt. (i) and (j) on both sides for 8i; j 2






N(N)FN 1(x)B(x; e(j))] = 0:










































Therefore, H = 0 and thus R() is linear in . Consequently, any disclosure
policy can be optimal.
Proof of Theorem 2.2









































































Note that EA(N) is linear in , which means the ex ante utility of all the
potential bidders is the same across the policies. By symmetry, the ex ante
utility of each potential bidder is invariant to the disclosure policy.
Analogously, we can prove the result for the risk-neutral case, where the





Recall that, from Proposition 2.2, we have
MX
N=1



































The linearity in  implies the ex ante utility of all the potential bidders is
the same across all feasible policies. By symmetry, the ex ante utility of each
potential bidder is invariant to the disclosure policy.
Proof of Lemma 2.5
Proof. Given the participant i0s posterior belief about the number of the par-
ticipants e(js) and value x 2 [0; x], he maximizes his expected utility by
choosing his bid b:
max
b
















e(N js)[(N   1)FN 2(x)f(x)(x  g(B(x)) 1
B0(x)
















e(N js)[FN 1(x)(x  g(B(x)))]: (B.13)
















Solving this linear dierential equation for EU(x), we have






where K is a constant, which can be identied from boundary condition

























Thus, the bidding function B(x; e(js)) of an entrant with belief e(js)













B(x; e(js)) = g 1(
MP
N=1








Proof of Theorem 2.3























N(N)FN 1(x)g(B(x; e(j)))] = 0:





















= iF i 1(x)g0(B(x; e(j))) d
d(j)
B(x; e(j))
















































































Using (B.15) and let (i) := d
d(i)


























































Since N(N)  0, FN 1(x)f(x)  0 and g0 > 0, we have the following results.
If g is convex, then H is negative semi-denite and R() is weakly concave.
Therefore, full concealment is optimal. If g is concave, then H is positive
semi-denite and R() is weakly convex. Therefore, full disclosure is optimal.
If g is linear, then H = 0 and R() is linear. Therefore, any disclosure policy
yields the same expected revenue.
We next show that a bidder's expected utility does not depend on the
disclosure policy. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.2, we could show this
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The linearity implies the ex ante utility of all the potential bidders is the same
across the policies. By symmetry, the ex ante utility of each potential bidder
is invariant to the disclosure policy.
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B.2 All-pay auction with nonlinear bidding cost
In this section, we consider an environment that is identical to Section 2.4
except that we adopt an all-pay auction instead of a rst-price auction. The
bidders are risk neutral, and their bidding costs are nonlinear. All selected
bidders bid simultaneously based on their posterior beliefs about the number
of actual bidders. The highest bidder wins and each bidder pays his own bid.
We maintain the same set of notations as in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
For an all-pay auction with non-linear bidding cost function g(), where
g() : R+ ! R+ is twice continuously dierentiable, g0() > 0 and g(0) = 0,
we rst characterize the unique symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equi-
librium. As usual, let B() be the corresponding equilibrium bidding function,
which is strictly increasing.
Given participant i0s posterior belief on the number of participants e(js)














At a Nash equilibrium:
dU(b)
db







e(N js)(N   1)FN 2(x)f(x)x 1
B0(x)
















e(N js)(N   1)FN 2(x)f(x)x:
We have







e(N js)(N   1)FN 2(t)f(t)tdt;
where K is a constant, which can be identied from boundary condition








e(N js)(N   1)FN 2(t)f(t)tdt): (B.18)
Thus, the bidding function B(x; e(js)) of an entrant with belief e(js)
and value x satises:







e(N js)(N   1)FN 2(t)f(t)tdt):
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Lemma B.1. For an all-pay auction with cost function g(), if participating
bidders hold the same posterior belief e(N js) and Assumption 2.2 holds,
entrants' unique symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy is







e(N js)(N   1)FN 2(t)f(t)tdt):
As in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we assume 0 2 int(M), where M = f 2
RM j(N)  0; 8N 2 
 = f0; 1; :::;Mg and P. MN=0(N) = 1g.
Combining Lemmas 2.1 and B.1, we have the following proposition, which
shows that the equilibrium strategy can be alternatively written in terms of
belief s.
Proposition B.1. Under Assumption 2.2, given a disclosure policy , condi-
tional on a signal realization s, entrants' unique symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy is



















; 8N 2 f0; 1; :::;Mg is a bid-
der's updated belief upon only the signal realization s (without knowing own
entry status).
Let  denote the belief of a bidder who only observes the public signal but
not his entry status. Conditional on N and , the sender's payo is




























































. 2supp()() = 0;






and  denotes the distribution of posteriors . The usual constraint on  , as
specied in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), applies.
We solve for the optimal disclosure policy and check the bidders' ex ante
utility in our context. Theorem B.1 summarizes the results.
Theorem B.1. Under Assumption 2.2, for an all-pay auction with cost func-
tion g, we have
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(i) the optimal disclosure policy is full concealment if g is convex;
(ii) the optimal disclosure policy is full disclosure if g is concave;
(iii) any policy renders the same total expected revenue if g is linear; and




























(N)N(N   1) R x
0
FN 2(t)f(t)tdt.



























In this case, R() is linear in , and any policy yields the same expected
revenue.















 [ i(i  1)
R x
0
















j(j   1) R x
0



















i(i  1) R x
0



















[i(i  1) R x
0
F i 2(t)f(t)tdt  j
[EN ]4











i(i  1) R x
0


























j(j   1) R x
0













 [ i(i  1)
R x
0
F i 2(t)f(t)tdt  EN
[EN ]2
 











i(i 1) R x0 F i 2(t)f(t)tdtEN iP. MN=1(N)N(N 1) R x0 FN 2(t)f(t)tdt
[EN ]2
.
Therefore, if g is convex, then H is negative semi-denite and R() is
weakly concave. Therefore, full concealment is optimal. If g is concave, thenH
is positive semi-denite and R() is weakly convex. Therefore, full disclosure
is optimal.




N [xFN 1(x)  g(B(x; e(j))]f(x)dx:





































The linearity implies the ex ante utility of all the potential bidders is the same
across the policies. By symmetry, the ex ante utility of each potential bidder
is invariant to the disclosure policy.
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Appendix C
Proofs of Chapter Three
Proof of Lemma 3.1: First, we show the existence of shutdown curves. For
any entry equilibrium induced by any given auction rule, consider any type
(ci; vi) 2 Ti. If this type of bidder i participates with a positive probability,
bidder i with types (c0i; vi) where c
0
i < ci must participate with probability
1. The arguments are the following. If bidder i with (c0i; vi) where c
0
i <
ci participates with probability 1 and mimics the bidding strategy of type
(ci; vi), he gets strictly positive expected payo since his entry cost is lower.
This implies that bidder i with (c0i; vi) must gain strictly positive payo when
he participates and bids optimally. Thus bidder i with (c0i; vi) participates
with probability 1. Equivalently, if bidder i with (ci; vi) participates with
probability 0, bidder i with types (c0i; vi) where c
0
i > ci must participate with
probability 0. Based on this observation, for each vi 2 [vi; vi], we have a critical
value Ci(vi) 2 [ci; ci] so that bidder i with types (ci; vi) where ci < Ci(vi)
must participate with probability 1, and bidder i with types (ci; vi) where
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ci > Ci(vi) must not participate. Note that there is no possibility of stochastic
participation unless for types (vi; Ci(vi)); 8vi 2 [vi; vi].
Second, we consider the monotonicity of these shutdown curves. We claim
that Ci(vi)  Ci(v0i), if vi > v0i. We show this by contradiction. Suppose
Ci(vi) < Ci(v
0
i) for vi  vi > v0i  vi. Consider bidder i with type (ci; vi)
where ci 2 (Ci(vi); Ci(v0i)). If he participates and mimics the strategy of type
(ci; v
0
i), his expected payo is at least equal to that of type (ci; v
0
i), which is
strictly positive. This leads to that bidder i with type (ci; vi) must participate
with probability 1. This conicts with the assumption that bidder i with type
(ci; vi) where ci 2 (Ci(vi); Ci(v0i)) does not participate.
Third, we show that Ci(vi) is continuous. Suppose Ci() is not continuous.
Without loss of generality, we assume that limv!vi Ci(v) < Ci(vi) for some
vi 2 (vi; vi). Then we must have limv!vi Ci(v) < Ci(vi) since Ci() is increas-
ing. Note that Ci() is a bounded increasing function, so we have limv!vi Ci(v)
exists. Consider bidder i with type (~ci; vi) where ~ci 2 (limv!vi Ci(v); Ci(vi)).
The expected payo of bidder i with type (~ci; vi) must be strictly positive.
Then bidder i with type (~ci; ~vi) where ~vi is slightly smaller than vi also gets
strictly positive expected payo if he mimics the strategy of type (~ci; vi). This
result conicts with the assumption that (~ci; ~vi) does not participate. 2
Lemma C.1. Consider shutdown curve Ci() for any bidder i 2 N . (i) If
vi` < v
i
u, the expected payo of bidder i with types (Ci(vi); vi) where vi 2 [vi`; viu]
is exactly zero if he participates; the expected payo of bidder i with types
(Ci(vi); vi) where vi 2 [vi; vi`) is no bigger than zero if he participates; the
expected payo of bidder i with types (Ci(vi); vi) where vi 2 (viu; vi] is no smaller
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than zero if he participates.
(ii) If vi` = v
i
u = vi (i.e., Ci(vi)  ci), the expected payo of bidder i with types
(ci; vi) where vi 2 [vi; vi] is no bigger than zero if he participates.
(iii) If vi` = v
i
u = vi (i.e., Ci(vi)  ci), the expected payo of bidder i with
types (ci; vi) where vi 2 [vi; vi] is no smaller than zero if he participates.
Proof of Lemma C.1: We rst consider the case where vi` < v
i
u. We show
that the expected payo of bidder i with types (Ci(vi); vi) where vi 2 (vi`; viu)
is exactly zero if he participates. On one hand, it can not be bigger than zero,
otherwise, bidder i with type (Ci(vi) + ; vi) will participate and mimic the
strategy of (Ci(vi); vi) to get strictly positive expected payo. This conicts
with the denition of Ci(vi). On the other hand, it can not be smaller than
zero. If he participates and mimics the strategy of type (Ci(vi)  ; vi), he will
at least get   where  can be smaller than any positive number. This conicts
with the fact that his best expected payo is negative if he participates. At
(ci`; v
i
`), the expected payo of bidder i can not be bigger than zero. Otherwise,
bidder i with type (ci`+ ; v
i





to get strictly positive expected payo. At (ci`; v
i
`), the expected payo of
bidder i can also not be smaller than zero. This is because if he participates
and mimics the strategy of type (ci`; v
i
` + ) then he will at least get   where
 can be smaller than any positive number. Thus the expected payo of
bidder i with type (ci`; v
i
`) is exactly zero if he participates. The same result
holds for type (ciu; v
i
u). Similar arguments lead to that the expected payo of
bidder i with types (Ci(vi); vi) where vi 2 [vi; vi`) is no bigger than zero if he
participates, and the expected payo of bidder i with types (Ci(vi); vi) where
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vi 2 (viu; vi] is no smaller than zero if he participates.
The results for the two cases where vi` = v
i
u can be similarly shown. 2









xi (m1 (t1 );    ;mi (ti );    ;mN (tN ))f(t i )dt i:
We rst establish the Lipschitz continuity of the shutdown curves. For this
purpose, we only need to show that 8 vi > v0i  vi` , we have Ci(vi) Ci(v0i) 
vi   v0i . Let ci = Ci(vi) and c0i = Ci(v0i). Let ti = (ci; vi); t0i = (c0i; v0i).
Incentive compatibility implies that
Ui(p;x; ti; ti)
= viQi(p; ti) Xi(p;ti)  ci









i) + (vi   v0i)Qi(p; t0i) + (c0i   ci):




i) = 0 as these two types are indierent
between participating and not participating. Therefore, we have 0  (vi  
v0i) Qi (p; t
0
i ) + c
0
i   ci , which leads to ci   c0i  (vi   v0i) Qi (p; t0i )  vi   v0i
. Hence, the shutdown curve is Lipschitz continuous when v 2 [vil ; viu] , which
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further implies that Ci() is Lipschitz continuous when vi 2 [vi; vi] .
Note that the monotonicity of Ci() implies that Ci() is dierentiable al-
most everywhere. We next show that the derivative C 0i(vi) (when it exists)
of the shutdown curve Ci at vi 2 (vi`; viu) equals exactly the expected winning
probability of the participant i with value vi regardless of his entry costs. Us-
ing Ui(p;x; ti; ti) and Qi(p; ti), we can reinterpret conditions (1) to (5), when
Ci() 6= ci and Ci() 6= ci, for all i 2 N . If a direct mechanism (p;x) is a truth-
ful one that implements entry C , then for all i 2 N , the following conditions
hold. Note that these conditions hold almost everywhere.
Qi(p; ti)  Qi(p; t0i); 8 ti = (ci; vi); t0i = (ci; v0i) 2  ip(Ci); vi  v0i;(C.1)
8 i 2 N ;
@Ui(p;x; ti; ti)
@vi
= Qi(p; ti); 8ti = (ci; vi) 2  ip(Ci); 8i 2 N ; (C.2)
@Ui(p;x; ti; ti)
@vi
= C 0i(vi); 8ti = (ci; vi) 2  ip(Ci); (C.3)
where vi 2 [vi`; viu]; 8 i 2 N ;
@Ui(p;x; ti; ti)
@ci
=  1; 8ti = (ci; vi) 2  ip(Ci); 8i 2 N ; (C.4)
Ui(p;x; ti; ti) = 0; 8 ti = (Ci(vi); vi); (C.5)
where vi 2 [vi`; viu]; 8 i 2 N :
(C.5) is from Lemma C.1(i). Similar procedure as in Myerson (1981) leads
to (C.1), (C.2) to (C.4) by considering single dimensional deviations of bid-




u, and let ci = Ci(vi); ci = Ci(v
0
i). Note
1Detailed proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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i))  Ui(p;x; (ci; v0i); (ci; v0i))]




i))  Ui(p;x; (ci; vi); (ci; vi))] = 0:
When v0i ! vi, we have c0i ! ci. (C.2) and (C.4) thus lead to (C.3). (C.3) and
(C.2) give C 0i(vi) = Qi(p; ti); 8ti = (ci; vi) 2  ip(Ci); where vi 2 (vi`; viu); 8 i 2
N .
From (C.2) and (C.3), we have C 0i(vi) = Qi(p; ti) 2 [0; 1]; 8vi 2 (vi`; viu) if
Ci() 6= ci and Ci() 6= ci; 8i 2 N . 2
Proof of Lemma 3.3: Let f!ng1n=0 to be a sequence of curve sets in 
 such
that for each i 2 N , supx2[vi;vi] j!ni (x)   !0i (x)j converges to zero as n ! 1.
We need to prove that limn!1 S(!n) = S(!0). For notational simplicity, we
denote  jp(!
n
j ) by Dnj, and Tj n Dnj by Dcnj. For a set K, let 1K denote the
indicator function of the set K; that is 1K is 1 on K and 0 outside K. We can

































fi(ti)dt1 : : : dtN :
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For each i = 1; : : : ; N , choose ti = (ci; vi) not on the curve !
0
i . We have
!0i (vi) > ci or !
0
i (vi) < ci. By the uniform convergence property of f!ng1n=1,
we obtain that !ni (vi) > ci or !
n
i (vi) < ci for n large enough, which also implies
that limn!1 1Dni(ti) = 1D0i(ti) and limn!1 1Dcni(ti) = 1Dc0i(ti). For each xed













is dominated by the integrable function maxj2N[f0gfvjg
QN
i=1 fi(ti) where v0 =

















i ). By the Dominated Convergence The-





















fi(ti)dt1 : : : dtN
= Etvh(t;!
0):




















i=1 fi(ti) is dominated by the integrable functionP
i2N ci
QN























Therefore, limn!1 S(!n) = S(!0). 2
Proof of Lemma 3.4: As S() is a continuous function dened on a
compact space 
, according to the classical Extreme Value Theorem (see page




For any given N curves ! 2 
, dene the following random variables:
8i 2 N ,
~vi(t i;! i) =8><>: maxfv0;maxf8j 6=i;(cj ;vj)2 jp(!j)g vjg; if fj 2 N n figj(cj ; vj) 2  
j
p(!j)g 6= ;;
v0; if fj 2 N n figj(cj ; vj) 2  jp(!j)g = ;:
~vi(t i;! i) thus is the highest value of the seller and all participating bidders
except i. If fj 2 N nfigj jp(!j) 6= ;g = ;, ~vi  v0. Denote the cumulative dis-
tribution function of ~vi by ~Gi(;! i), where ! i = (!1;    ; !i 1; !i+1;    ; !N).
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We extend fj so that fj(tj) = 0 when tj 2 R2 nTj. Thus Fj can be dened on
R2 as well. Let j be the probability measure on R2 induced by Fj. Fix any
v  v0. It is clear that maxj2I[f0g vj  v if and only if vj  v for each j 2 I.
In particular, maxj2I[f0g vj  v0 if and only if vj  v0 for each j 2 I. By the























































which has a density to be denoted by ~gi(v;! i). We have ~Gi(v;! i) = 0 if
v < v0 and ~Gi(v;! i) = 1 if v > maxj 6=ifvjg, and ~gi(v;! i) = 0 if v < v0 or
v > maxj 6=ifvjg. Note that ~Gi(v0;! i) can be strictly positive since v0 can be
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a mass point .
Dene




(vi   v)~gi(v;! i)dv   ci;8ti = (ci; vi) 2  ip(!i):




i has a density function of ~gi(v;!

 i) for
v > v0. In addition, Pr(~v

i = v0) = ~Gi(v0;!

 i). Thus, Si((ci; vi);!

 i) can be
interpreted as the marginal contribution of bidder i of type (ci; vi) to S(!
).
Note that Si((ci; vi);!





Using the above new notations, S(!) can be alternatively written as














Since ! 2 argmax!2
S(!), we must have









Note that Si((ci; vi);!

 i) strictly decreases with ci and weakly increases with
vi. We thus can dene the following new function ~!

i () for bidder i. For any
vi 2 [vi; vi], if Si((ci; vi);! i)  0, then ~!i (vi) = ci; if Si((ci; vi);! i)  0,
then ~!i (vi) = ci; otherwise, ~!






Clearly, ~!i () is well dened and increasing. If ~!i ()  ci or ~!i ()  ci, it
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then belongs to 









 i) = 0. In addition, ~!

i ()  ci if vi 2 [vi; ~vi` ) and ~!i ()  ci











(vi   v)~gi(v;! i)dv   ~!i (vi)  0;8vi 2 [~vi` ; ~viu ]:
Dierentiating this equation on both sides leads to ~!
0
i (vi) = ~Gi(vi;!

 i) 2
[0; 1]; 8vi 2 [~vi` ; ~viu ] , which conrms the Lipschitz condition for ~!0i (vi) . This
means that ~!i () 2 
i .
In all the three cases considered in the previous paragraph, the ~!i ()
belongs to 










any other curve in 
i does not maximize the same objective function. Note
that the uniqueness of the optimal ~!i () is due to positive density fi(; ) .
Therefore, we must have !i () = ~!i () at every point by the continuity of the
two functions. Thus, the properties of ~!i () must hold for !i () .
Dene (vi`; v
i
u) for any ! = (!i) 2 





 i) = 0;8vi 2 [vi` ; viu ]; if vi` < viu ;
Si((ci; vi);!

 i)  0; if !i (vi)  ci;
Si((vi; ci);!

 i)  0; if !i (vi)  ci:
Recall Si((ci; vi);!

 i) strictly decreases with ci and weakly increases with
vi . Therefore we have the properties in Lemma 3.4 for the contribution of a
type ti to S(!
) . 2
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